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The English term "[[frustration]]" came into increasing prominence in certain branches of [[psychoanalytic theory]] in the 1950s, together with a shift in emphasis from the Oedipal triangle to the [[mother]]-[[child]] [[dual relation|relation]].

The English term 'In this context, [[frustration' came into increasing prominence in certain branches of psychoanalytic theory in ]] was generally understood as the 1950s, together with a shift in emphasis from act whereby the Oedipal triangle to [[mother]] denies the mother-[[child relation]] the [[object]] which would satisfy one of his [[biology|biological]] [[need]]s.

In this context, frustration was generally understood as the act whereby the MOTHER denies the child the object which would satisfy one of his biological NEEDS.  To [[frustrate ]] a [[child ]] in this way was thought by some analysts to be a major factor in the aetiology of [[neurosis]].

'"[[Frustration' ]]" is also the term which the ''[[Standard Edition ]]'' uses to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Frustration|Versagung.  While this term is not extremely prominent in Freud]]''s work, it does form part of his theoretical vocabulary.

At a first glance, indeedWhile this term is not extremely prominent in [[Freud]]'s work, it may appear that Freud discusses frustration in the way described abovedoes form part of his theoretical vocabulary.

For example he certainly attributes to frustration an impor­tant place in the aetiology of symptomsAt a first glance, indeed, stating it may appear that 'it was a [[Freud]] discusses [[frustration that made ]] in the patient ill' (Freud, 1919a: SE XVII, 162)way described above.

Hence when Lacan argues that For example he certainly attributes to [[frustration]] an impor­tant place in the term 'frustration' is 'quite simply absent from Freud'aetiology of [[symptom]]s work' (S3, 235), what he means is stating that the Freudian concept of Versagung does not correspond to the concept of "it was a frustration as described in that made the above paragraphpatient ill."<ref>{{F}} 1919a. [[SE]] XVII, 162. </ref>

Hence when [[Lacan ]] argues that those who have theorised the concept of term "[[frustration in this way have, by deviating ]]" is "quite simply absent from Freud's work, led psychoanalytic theory into a series "<ref>{{S3}} p.235</ref> what he means is that the [[Freud]]ian concept of impasses (S4, 180)''[[Frustration|Versagung]]'' does not correspond to the concept of [[frustration]] as described in the above paragraph.

Thus in [[Lacan]] argues that those who have theorised the seminar concept of 1956-7 he seeks [[frustration]] in this way have, by deviating from [[Freud]]'s work, led [[psychoanalytic theory]] into a way series of reformulating the concept in accordance with the logic of Freudian theoryimpasses.<ref>{{S4}} p. 180</ref>

Lacan begins by classifying Although he concedes that [[frustration as one ]] is at the heart of the three types of 'lack of object'primary relations between [[mother]] and [[child]], distinct from both castration and privation (see LACK)<ref>{{S4}} p.66</ref> he argues that [[frustration]] does not concern [[biology|biological]] [[need]]s but the [[demand]] for [[love]].

Although he concedes This is not to say that [[frustration is at the heart ]] has nothing to do with a [[real]] [[object]] capable of the primary relations between mother and child satisfying a [[need]] (S4e.g. a breast, 66or a feeding bottle); on the contrary, such an [[object]] is certainly involved, he argues that frustration does not concern biological needs but the DEMAND for loveat least at first.<ref>{{S4}} p. 66</ref>

This However, what is important is not to s.ay that frustration has nothing to do with a the real function of this [[object capable of satisfying ]] (to [[satisfaction|satisfy]] a [[need (e.g. a breast]], or a feeding bottlesuch as hunger); on the contraryis soon completely overshadowed by its symbolic function, such an object is certainly involvednamely, at least at first (the fact that it functions as a [[symbol]] of the [[mother]]'s [[love]].<ref>{{S4, 66)}} p. 180-2</ref>

However, what The [[object]] is important is that the real function of this object (thus valued more for being a symbolic gift than for its capacity to satisfy a [[need, such as hunger) is soon completely overshadowed by its symbolic function, namely, the fact that it functions as a symbol of the mother's love (S4, 180-2)]].

The object is thus valued more for being a symbolic gift than for its capacity to satisfy a need. As a gift, it is inscribed in the [[symbolic order|symbolic network ]] of laws [[law]]s which regulate the circuit of exchanges, and thus seen as something to which the [[subject ]] has a legitimate claim (.<ref>{{S4, }} p.101). </ref>

[[Frustration]], properly speaking, can only occur in the context of this [[law|legal ]] [[order]], and thus when the [[object ]] which the [[infant demands ]] [[demand]]s is not provided, one can only speak of [[frustration ]] when the [[infant ]] senses that it has been wronged (.<ref>{{S4, }} p.101). </ref>

In such a case, when the [[object ]] is eventually provided, the sense of wrong (of broken promises, of love withheld) persists in the [[child]], who then consoles himself for this by enjoying the sensations which follow the [[satisfaction ]] of the original [[need]].

Thus, far from [[frustration ]] involving the failure to satisfy a [[biological ]] [[need]], it often involves precisely the opposite; a [[biological ]] [[need ]] is [[satisfied ]] as a vain attempt to compensate for the true [[frustration]], which is the refusal of [[love]].

Frustration plays an important role in psychoanalytic treatment.  [[Freud ]] noted that, to the extent that distressing symptoms [[symptom]]s disappear as the [[treat­ment ]] progresses, the [[patient]]'s motivation to continue the [[treatment ]] tends to diminish accordingly.  In order, therefore, to avoid the risk of the patient losing motivation altogether and breaking off the treatment prematurely, Freud recommended that the analyst must 're-instate [the patient's suffer­ing] elsewhere in the form of some appreciable privation' (Freud, 1919a: SE XVIi, 163).

This technical advice is generally known as In order, therefore, to avoid the rule risk of abstinencethe [[patient]] losing motivation altogether and breaking off the [[treatment]] prematurely, and implies [[Freud]] recommended that the [[analyst ]] must continually frustrate "re-instate [the patient by refusing to gratify his demands for love's suffer­ing] elsewhere in the form of some appreciable privation."<ref>{{F}} 1919a. [[SE]] XVII, 163</ref>

In this wayThis technical advice is generally known as the rule of abstinence, 'and implies that the [[analyst]] must continually [[frustrate]] the [[patient']] by refusing to gratify his [[demand]]s need and longing should be allowed to persist in her, in order to serve as forces impelling her to do work and to make changes' (Freud, 1915a: SE XII, 165)for [[love]].

While [[Lacan ]] agrees with [[Freud ]] that the [[analyst ]] must not gratify the [[analysand]]'s demands [[demand]]s for love, he argues that this act of [[frustration ]] is not to be seen as an end in itself.

Rather, [[frustration ]] must be seen simply as a means to enable the signifiers [[signifier]]s of previous demands [[demand]]s to appear.

'<blockquote>"The analyst is he who supports the demand, not, as has been said, to frustrate the subject, but in order to allow the signifiers in which his frustration is bound up to reappear' (."<ref>{{E, }} p.255). </ref></blockquote>

The aim of the [[analyst ]] is, by supporting the [[analysand]]'s demands [[demand]]s in a state of [[frustration]], to go beyond [[demand ]] and cause the [[analysand]]'s [[desire ]] to appear (.<ref>{{E, }} p.276). </ref>

[[Lacan ]] differs from [[Freud ]] in the way he theorises the rule of abstinence.

For [[Freud]], the rule of abstinence primarily concerned the [[analysand]]'s abstinence from sexual activity; if a [[patient ]] implores the [[analyst ]] to make [[love ]] to her, the [[analyst ]] must [[frustrate ]] her by refusing to do so.

While [[Lacan ]] agrees with this advice, he stresses that there is a much more common [[demand ]] that the [[analyst ]] can also [[frustrate ]] -- the [[analysand]]'s [[demand ]] for a reply.

The [[analysand ]] expects the [[analyst ]] to follow the rules of everyday conversation.

By refusing to follow these rules -- remaining silent when the [[analysand ]] asks a question, or taking the [[analysand]]'s words in a way other than that in which they were intended -- the [[analyst ]] has a powerful means at his disposal for [[frustrating ]] the [[analysand]].