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<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess [[right]] now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[DesireFreud]] 's ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a major dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[psychoanalytic theorydésir]]'' and which make it "a [[category]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

By shifting the object of study from the imagery of the [[manifest]] [[content]] of the [[dream]] to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, Freud unveiled the [[structure]] of both the dream and [[The concept Subject|the subject]]. Beyond the [[preconscious]] wishes attached to a [[number]] of desirable [[desireobjects]] is that the central concern dream-[[work]] utilizes, there lies the unconscious wish — indestructible, [[infantile]] in its origins, the product of [[psychoanalytic theoryrepression]], permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other [[formations]]of the unconscious.

The [[Lacanmodel]]'s term, ''of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[On Dreams|on dreams]] remained his [[désirguide]]'', is the term used in for the French translations rest of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish' by Strachey his theoretical and clinical production; in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish'pa rticular, which is closer it continued to Freud's Wunschinform, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to until the French termend, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English translators have opted clinical interventions — [[interpretations]] and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[them]]. This model is inseparable from the latter, since [[form]] of [[discourse]] that Freud created: the English term 'desire' conveys, like the French term, the implication rule of a continuous forcefree [[association]], which is essential to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to Hegelsubject's Begierde as are carried by the French termspeech, reveals his/her desire and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept of dÈsir and which make gap that constitutes it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80).

==Human Desire==If there is any one concept which can claim to be Lacan's elaboration of the very center of praxis ([[theory]] and [[Lacanpractice]]'s thought) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and attempting to abbreviate it is or replace the concept of necessary [[reading]] with a [[desiresummary]]would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan's works) and further lines of enquiry.

A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan's work contains a [[LacanHegelian]] follows reference, according to which desire is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the [[Spinozadifference]] in arguing that "between his and Hegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [[desire1959]]" is the essence of man, pp."<ref>{{S11}} p292-325).275</ref>

[[Desire]] But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is simultaneously from the heart start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[humantransference]] -relation). In '[[existence]] The function and the central concern field of [[speech and language in psychoanalysis]].' (1953), Lacan writes:

However, when :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[Lacanmeaning]] talks about [[in the desire]]of the other, it is not any kind of so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first [[object of desire]] he is referring tobe recognized by the other. (Lacan, but always 1977 [[unconscious]] [[desire]1959], p.58)

This That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[value]] later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is not because [[Lacandialectical]] sees , that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is the desire of the Other (over and above the [[consciousothers]] who are [[desireconcrete]] as unimportantincarnations of the Other), but simply because it is not '[[unconsciousnatural]] ', endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or [[another]] irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desireis always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental [[Concepts]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysisPsycho]]-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

Lacan's study of the dialectical [[Unconsciousnature]] of desire led to his [[distinction]] between desire, need and demand. The [[three]] [[terms]] describe lacks in the subject; yet it is entirely indispensable to [[sexuality|sexualidentify]]:each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital [[needs]] is subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.

<blockquote>"The motives least noisy appeal of the unconscious are limited infant is already inscribed in language, as it is [[interpreted]] by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desireThis primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a [[speaking]] being, that a subject of hungerspeech, even at the [[stage]] in which he/she is not representedstill infant."<ref>{{E}} pThis subordination to the Other through language marks the human forever.142</ref>Lacan writes:

:The [[phenomenology]] that emerges from [[analytic]] [[experience]] is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[character]] by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an [[absence]] — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[satisfying]] needs, that is to say, the [[power]] of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[satisfied]] [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the [[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[Spaltung]]). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 286---7)

This residual status of desire constitutes its [[Desireessence]] is ; at this point the heart question of the [[human]] [[existence]], fundamental to every aspect Object of Desire|object of the [[psychic]] [[lifedesire]] acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of the [[individual]] and this object to be his only original contribution to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embeddedpsychoanalysis.

Although an exaggeration in [[Desirereality]] provides , Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[rational]] critique of the [[subjectnotion]] with its primary motivation and of '[[frustrationobject relations]]' and its clinical applications.

==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment====Truth of Desire in Psychoanalytic Treatment==The For what Lacan emphasized was the [[aimillusory]] nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatmentreal]] ; and it is to lead in this gap that the [[analysandobject a]] to recognize , the object [[truthcause of desire]] about his or her , installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in [[desireparticular]], chapter 20).

It is only possible to recognize oneDesire requires the support of the [[fantasy]], which operates as its ''mise en scène''s , where the [[desirefading]] when it is articulate in subject faces the [[speechlost object]]thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

<blockquote>"It This permanent [[displacement]] of desire follows the [[logic]] of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is only once its interpretation, as it is formulated, named in moves along the [[presencechain]] of the unconscious [[othersignifiers]], that without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (cf. [[desireSeminar]]VI, whatever it is'[[Desire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p1958-59).183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in In the [[psychoanalysisanalytic experience]], "whatdesire 's important must be taken literally', as it is to teach through the unveiling of the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [[subject]1959] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]pp."<ref>{{S2}} p256-77).228</ref>

However, it Desire is not a question the other side of the law: the contributions of seeking psychoanalysis to ethical [[reflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[principle]] (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a new means [[barrier]] to jouissance - the jouissance of expression for the drive (always [[partial]], not in relation to the [[body]] considered as a given [[desiretotality]], for this would imply a expressionist theory but to the [[organic]] function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), and that of the [[languagesuper-ego]](with its implacable command to [[enjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).

On Thus, desire appears to be on the contraryside of [[life]] preservation, by articulating as it opposes the lethal [[dimension]] of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [[living]] organism, and the [[demands]] of the [[superego]] - that `[[senseless]] law' - which result in the [[self]]-destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[guilt]]). But desireitself is not without a structural relation with [[death]] in : death at the heart of the [[speechspeaking being]], 's lack-in-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the [[analysandworld]] brings it into that entice desire, inducing its [[existencealienation]], without ever satisfying any promise.

<blockquote>"That There is no Sovereign [[Good]] that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or [[subjectguarantee]] should come to recognise and to name his the subject's well-being. As a consequence, the [[desireethics]]; of psychoanalysis require that is the efficacious action of [[analysisanalyst]]. But does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it isn't a question of rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only [[recognisingthing]] something of which would one can be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subjectguilty]] createsis of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, brings forth1992, a new [[presence]] in the worldp."<ref>{{S2}} p319).228-9</ref></blockquote>

The This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological [[analysandstate]]of the analyst. It is his/her lack-in-being, by articulating rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's [[desireDirection of the Treatment|direction of the treatment]](Lacan, 1977 [1959] in , p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an [[speechideal]]for the analysand, (does not simply give expression to and that he/she occupies a pre-existing position of [[desiresemblant]] but ratherof the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998) brings that [[. Only in this way may the analyst's desire]] into become the [[existenceinstrument]]of the analysand's access to his/her own desire.

However, there is a limit to how far References[[desireFreud, S.]] can be articulated in [(1953) [speech]1900a] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desireThe Interpretation of Dreams]] and . Standard Edition of the [[speechComplete]];"<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility Psychological Works of the [[unconsciousSigmund Freud]] (i, Vols 4 & 5.e. the fact the the [[unconsciousLondon]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''): Hogarth Press.

"Although #Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[Miller]]). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[truthHamlet]] about '. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the [[desirewhole]] is present to some degree seminar available in all French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[speechFour Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [[speechSade]] can never articulate the whole '. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[truthpsychanalyse]] about , 1969-1970. [[desireParis]]; whenever : Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) [[speechThe Seminar]] attempts to articulate , Book VII, [[desireThe Ethics of Psychoanalysis]], there is always a leftover1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, a [[surplusEncore]], which exceeds 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[speechKnowledge]]."<ref>{{Evans}} pNew York: W.W. Norton. [[Leonardo]] S.36</ref>Rodriguez

One of Lacan=====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's most important criticisms of is to teach the psychoanalytic theories [[subject]] to [[name]], to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is not a question of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire with the related concepts ]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of DEMAND and NEED[[language]]. In opposition to this tendency On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three conceptsthe [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. This distinction begins to emerge (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in his work in 1957 [[speech]], (see S4, 100does not simply give expression to a pre-1, 125), existing [[desire]] but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958crather)brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].)

Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to <blockquote>"That the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human [[subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable ]] should come to satisfy its own needs, recognise and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocallyname his [[desire]]; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond is the satisfaction efficacious [[action]] of need, since this presence symbolises the Other[[analysis]]. But it isn's love. Hence demand soon takes on t a double function, serving both as an articulation question of need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects [[recognising]] something which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craveswould be entirely given. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second' (E, 287).Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand; ''Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need' (E, 311). Unlike a needIn naming it, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject until another need arises]] creates, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressurebrings forth, and eternal. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but a new [[presence]] in the reproduction of desire as suchworld."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>

Lacan's distinction However, there is a [[limit]] to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between need [[desire]] and desire, [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which lifts explains the concept of desire completely out [[irreducibility]] of the realm of biology, [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is strongly reminiscent of KojËvenot that which ''s distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desirenot known'', or to an object but that which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve, 1947: 6cannot be known'').

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. "Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), [[truth]] about [[desire ]] is one whereas the drives are many. In other words[[present]] to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called whole [[truth]] about [[desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only one object of ]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], OBJETPETITA, and this there is represented by always a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards which desire tendsleftover, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object[[surplus]], but a relation to a LACKwhich exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.36</ref>

=====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire is ]] with the desire related concepts of the Other' (Sll[[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, 235)[[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This can be understood distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in many complementary ways1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of which the following are Phallus|The signification of the most importantphallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91].</ref>

1=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. Desire The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is essentially unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to [[help]] it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'desire s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The [[primitive]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s desire'[[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, which means both desire to be an importance that goes beyond the object [[satisfaction]] of another[[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s desire[[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and desire as a [[demand]] for recognition by another[[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], via KojËveremains [[unsatisfied]], who states:and this leftover is [[desire]].

<blockquote>"Desire is human only if neither the one desiresappetite for satisfaction, not nor the bodydemand for love, but the Desire difference that results from the subtraction of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human valuefirst from the second. "<ref>{{E}} p. . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'. (KojËve, 1947: 6)287</ref></blockquote>

KojËve goes on <blockquote>"Desire begins to argue (still following Hegel) that take shape in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life margin in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER)which [[demand]] becomes separated from need. That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother"<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote>

2. It is qua Other that Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject desires (E]] until another [[need]] arises, 312): that [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it isconstant in its pressure, the subject desires from the point of view of anotherand eternal. The effect realisation of this is that '[[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the object reproduction of man's [[desire ]] as such. . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:

12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality =====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The [[desire ]] completely out of the Other realm of [[biology]], is thus what makes objects equivalent strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and exchangeable[[human]] [[desire]]; this 'tends [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to diminish an object which is "perfectly useless from the special significance [[biology|biological]] point of any one particular objectview."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' Alexandre]] (Lacan, 1951b: 121947 [1933-39]).This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only Introduction to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire Reading of another directed towards the same objectHegel''. Trans. [[James]] H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËveBasic Books, 19471969: 6).</ref>

The reason for this goes back =====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s. Although they both belong to the former point about human field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire being ]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many. In other [[words]], the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire for recognition; ]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by desiring that a variety of [[partial objects]] in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which another desires[[desire]] tends, I can make but the other recognise my right [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to possess that an [[object]], and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40)but a relation to a [[lack]].

This universal feature =====Desire of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric is one who sustains another personOther=====One of [[Lacan]]'s desire, converts anothermost oft-repeated [[formulas]] is: "man's desire into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what is important in the analysis desire of a hysteric is not to find out the object Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be [[understood]] in many complementary ways, of her desire but to discover which the place from which she desires (following are the subject with whom she identifies)most important.

# =====More=====1. [[Desire ]] is essentially "desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other (S7, 67).# Desire is always 'the s desire for something else' (E", 167), since it is impossible which means both [[desire]] to desire what one already has. The be the [[object ]] of another's [[desire is continually deferred]], which is why and [[desire is a METONYMY (E, 175)]] for [[recognition]] by another.

The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that desire is a social productto say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is not , finally, a function of the private affair it appears desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires Reading of other subjectsHegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>

The first person =====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to occupy achieve the place of the Other is the mother[[desire]]d recognition, and at first the child [[subject]] must risk his own life in a [[struggle]] for pure prestige (see [[master]]). That [[desire]] is at essentially [[desire]] to be the mercy [[object]] of her another's [[desire. It ]] is only when clearly illustrated in the Father articulates desire with first '[[time]]' of the law by castrating the mother that [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject is freed from subjection ]] desires to be the whims of [[phallus]] for the [[mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX)]].

  ==Desire, Need and Demand==[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[desire]]* [[need]] =(''besoin''M)* [[demand]] (''demande'')   other===Need==The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s. [[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. [[Need]] emerges according first person to occupy the requirements place of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]]. The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s.  ==Demand==The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]]. The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Othermother]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]]. The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]]. [[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]). The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].  The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.  The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]]. Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]] This leftover is [[desire]].  ==Desire==[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the at first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote> [[Desirechild]] is at the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation mercy of [[need]] in [[demand]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]]. A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises. [[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   ==Desire of the Other==[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the her [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. [[Desire]] It is [[human]] only when it is directed toward another [[desire]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[OtherFather]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of articulates [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to with the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].  ==Object of the Other's Desire==[[Desire]] is the [[desirelaw]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phalluscastrating]] for the [[mother]].  ==Object Desired by Others==<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. ==Desire for the Other==[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>  ==Impossible Desire==<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>  ==Social Desire==[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product.[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectical]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge freed from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears subjection to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety whims of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].  ==Desire and Prohibition==<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)   ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infantmother]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].  The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.  The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.  No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].  ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].  

[[Category:Concepts]][[Category:TermsMess]]