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In [[Freud]]'s [[work]], the term '[[affect]]' stands in opposition to the term '[[idea]]'.
The opposition between the affective and the intellectual is one of the oldest themes in [[philosophy]], and made its way into [[Freud]]'s [[vocabulary ]] via [[German]] [[psychology]].
For [[Lacan]], however, the opposition between the [[affective]] and the [[intellectual]] is not valid in the psychoanalytic field.
'This opposition is one of the most contrary to [[analytic ]] experience and most unenlightening when it comes to [[understanding ]] it' (Sl, 274).
Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of [[being ]] over-[[intellectual]] and of neglecting the [[role ]] of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this [[criticism]] is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a [[false ]] opposition.
([[Lacan]] also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy [[thinking]].<ref>{{E}} p.171</ref>
[[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the [[symbolic]] [[order]], which transcends the opposition between [[affect]] and [[intellect]].
On the one hand, [[psychoanalytic]] experience 'is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy' (Sl, 55).
On the other hand, nor is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] an intellectual affair; 'we are not dealing here with an intellectual [[dimension]]' (Sl, 274).
The [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalyst]] must thus be aware of the ways in which both 'affective smoochy-woochy' and intellectualisation can be [[resistance]]s to [[analysis]], [[imaginary]] [[lure]]s of the [[ego]].
[[Anxiety]] is the only [[affect]] that is not deceptive.
[[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the [[affect]]ive is not a [[separate ]] realm opposed to the [[intellectual]].
'The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a [[mythical ]] beyond of the production of the [[symbol ]] which would precede the discursive formulation.'<ref>Sl, 57</ref>
However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a [[whole ]] year of the [[seminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxiety]] (Lacan, 1973a: 38).
[[Lacan]] does not propose a general [[theory ]] of affects, but only touches on [[them ]] insofar as they impinge on [[psychoanalytic treatment]].
He insists on the [[relationship ]] of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] is affected by his relation with the [[Other]].
He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s (S7, 102-3), and emphasises [[Freud]]'s [[position ]] that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational [[representative ]] (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s [[terms]], the [[signifier]]) (Ec, 714).
[[Lacan]]'s comments on the [[concept ]] of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[practice]].
Firstly, all the [[concepts ]] in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly.
Secondly, the [[affect]]s are [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst]] must be wary of being tricked by his own [[affect]]s.
This does not mean that the [[analyst]] must disregard his own [[feelings ]] for the [[patient]], but simply that he must [[know ]] how to make adequate use of them.
Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is not the reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] [[about ]] [[desire]].
[[Another ]] term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from '[[affect]]', is the term '[[passion]]'.
[[Lacan]] speaks of the '[[three ]] fundamental passions': [[love]], [[hate]] and [[ignorance]] (Sl, 271); this is a reference to [[Buddhist]] [[thought ]] (E, 94).
These [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary]] phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three [[order]]s.
In nineteenth-century [[psychology]] the term is synonymous with [[emotion]] or [[excitement]].
Borrowing from that [[tradition]], [[psychoanalysis]] defines [[afect]] as a quantity of [[psychic]] [[energy]] or a sum of [[excitation]] accompanying events that take [[place ]] in the [[life]] of the [[psyche]].
[[Affect]] is not a direct [[emotion]]al [[representation]] of an [[event]], but a [[trace]] or residue that is aroused or reactivated through the [[repetition]] of that [[event]] of by some equivalent to it.
Like [[libido]], [[affect]] is quantifiable and both [[drives]] and [[image]]s are therefore said to have a quota of affect.
In [[Freud]]'s earliest theory of [[hysteria]] (the so-called [[seduction thoery]]), the blocking of the [[affect]] correspodning to a [[trauma]]tic [[event]] has a causal role; because it cannot be expressed or [[discharged ]] in [[word]]s, it takes the [[form ]] of a [[somatic]] [[symptom]].
In his later writings [[Freud]] consistently makes a [[distinction ]] between [[affect]] and [[representation]]s, which may be either [[verbal]] or [[visual]].
The [[verbalization]] of the [[talking cure]] thus becomes an intellectualized way of [[discharging]] [[affect]]s relating to [[childhood]] [[experience]]s.
Affect :
[[Ideas]], abstract concepts of [[instinctual ]] wishes ; emotions, motoric and secretary discharges connected with instinctual tension ([[pleasure]]-[[unpleasure ]] [[principle]])
Affect :
Terme général pour exprimer tous les phénomènes de l’affectivité c’est-à-[[dire ]] toutes les nuances du [[plaisir ]] et de la [[douleur]].
affect 217 [[Seminar XI]]
