Difference between revisions of "Cogito"

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[[Lacan]]'s works abound in references to the famous phrase by [[Descartes]], ''cogito ergo sum'' ("I think, therefore I am").<ref>1637: 54</ref>
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This phrase (which [[Lacan]] often refers to simply as 'the ''[[cogito]]''') comes to stand, in [[Lacan]]'s work, for [[Descartes]]'s entire [[philosophy]].
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[[Lacan]]'s attitude to [[Cartesian]]ism is extremely complex, and only a few of the most important points can be summarised here.
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1. On one level, the ''[[cogito]]'' comes to stand for the modern western concept of the [[Ego]], based as it is on the notions of the self-sufficiency and self-[[transparency]] of [[consciousness]], and the [[autonomy]] of the [[ego]].<ref>{{E}} p.6</ref> 
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Although [[Lacan]] does not believe that the modern western concept of the [[ego]] was invented by [[Descartes]] or by any other [[individual]], he argues that it was born in the same era in which [[Descartes]] was writing (the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth century), and is particularly clearly expressed by [[Descartes]].<ref>{{See S2, 6-7</ref>
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Thus, although this concept of the [[ego]] seems so natural and eternal to western man today, it is in fact a relatively recent cultural construct; its eternal-natural appearance is in fact an [[illusion]] produced by retroaction.<ref>{{S2}} p.4-5</ref>
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[[Lacan]] argues that the experience of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is an experience that leads us to oppose any [[philosophy]] directly issuing from the ''[[Cogito]]''.<ref>{{E}} p.1; {{S2}} p.4</ref>
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[[Freud]]'s discovery of the [[unconscious]] subverts the [[Cartesian]] concept of [[subjectivity]] because it disputes the [[Cartesian]] equation [[subject]] = [[ego]] = [[consciousness]].
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One of [[Lacan]]'s main criticisms of [[ego-psychology]] and [[object-relations theory]] is that these [[school]]s betrayed [[Freud]]'s discovery by returning to the pre-[[Freud]]ian concept of the [[subject]] as an [[autonomous ego]].<ref>{{S2}} p.l1</ref>
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2. On another level, [[Lacan]]'s views can be seen not only as a subversion of the ''[[cogito]]'', but also as an extension of it, for the ''[[cogito]]'' not only encapsulates the false equation [[subject]] = [[ego]] = [[consciousness]] which [[Lacan]] opposes, but also focuses attention on the concept of the [[subject]], which [[Lacan]] wishes to retain.
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Thus the ''[[cogito]]'' contains within itself the seeds of its own subversion, by putting forward a concept of [[subjectivity]] which undermines the modern concept of the [[ego]].
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This concept of [[subjectivity]] refers to what [[Lacan]] calls "the subject of science": a [[subject]] who is denied all intuitive access to [[knowledge]] and is thus left with reason as the only path to [[knowledge]].<ref>{{Ec}} p.831; {{Ec}} p.858</ref>
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By opposing the [[subject]] to the [[ego]], [[Lacan]] proposes that the [[subject]] of the [[Cartesian]] ''[[cogito]]'' is in fact one and the same as the [[subject]] of the [[unconscious]].
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[[Psychoanalysis]] can thus operate with a [[Cartesian]] method, advancing from [[doubt]] to [[certainty]], with the crucial difference that it does not start from the statement "I think" but from the affirmation "it thinks."<ref>{{Sll}} p.35-6</ref>
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[[Lacan]] rewrites [[Descartes]]'s phrase in various ways, such as "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think."<ref>{{E}} p.166</ref>
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[[Lacan]] also uses the ''[[cogito]]'' to distinguish between the [[subject]] of the [[statement]] and the [[subject]] of the [[enunciation]].<ref>{{Sll}} p.138-42; see {{Sl7}} p.180-4</ref>
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==See Also==
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==References==
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<references/>
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[[Category:Dictionary]]
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[[Category:Terms]]
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[[Category:Concepts]]
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[[Category:Philosophy]]
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[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]
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[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
 
{{Les termes}}
 
{{Les termes}}
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cogito       
 
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Lacan's works abound in references to the famous phrase by Descartes, cogito ergo sum ('I think, therefore I am' - see Descartes, 1637: 54). This phrase (which Lacan often refers to simply as 'the cogito') comes to stand, in Lacan's work, for Descartes's entire philosophy. Lacan's attitude to Cartesianism is extremely complex, and only a few of the most important points can be summarised here.
 
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1. On one level, the cogito comes to stand for the modern western concept of the [[Ego]], based as it is on the notions of the self-sufficiency and self-transparency of [[consciousness]], and the autonomy of the ego (see E, 6).  Although Lacan does not believe that the modern western concept of the ego was invented by Descartes or by any other individual, he argues that it was born in the same era in which Descartes was writing (the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth century), and is particularly clearly expressed by Descartes (see S2, 6-7).
 
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Thus, although this concept of the ego seems so natural and eternal to western man today, it is in fact a relatively recent cultural construct; its eternal-natural appearance is in fact an illusion produced by retroaction (S2, 4-5).
 
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Lacan argues that the experience of psychoanalytic treatment is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the Cogito' (E, 1; see S2, 4). Freud's discovery of the unconscious subverts the Cartesian concept of subjectivity because it disputes the Cartesian equation subject = ego  = consciousness. One of Lacan's main criticisms of ego-psychology and object-relations theory is that these schools betrayed Freud's discovery by returning to the pre-Freudian concept of the subject as an autonomous ego (S2, l 1).
 
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2. On another level, Lacan's views can be seen not only as a subversion of the cogito, but also as an extension of it, for the cogito not only encapsulates the false equation subject    = ego  = consciousness which Lacan opposes, but also focuses attention on the concept of the [[subject]], which Lacan wishes to retain. Thus the cogito contains within itself the seeds of its own subversion, by putting forward a concept of subjectivity which undermines the modern concept of the ego. This concept of subjectivity refers to what Lacan calls 'the subject of science': a subject who is denied all intuitive access to knowledge and is thus left with reason as the only path to knowledge (Ec, 831; see Ec, 858).
 
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By opposing the subject to the ego, Lacan proposes that the subject of the Cartesian cogito is in fact one and the same as the subject of the unconscious.
 
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Psychoanalysis can thus operate with a Cartesian method, advancing from doubt to certainty, with the crucial difference that it does not start from the statement 'I think' but from the affirmation 'it thinks' (Áa pense) (Sll, 35--6).
 
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Lacan rewrites Descartes's phrase in various ways, such as 'I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think' (E, 166). Lacan also uses the cogito to distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the [[enunciation]]. <ref>(see Sll, 138-42; see Sl7, 180-4)</ref>
 

Revision as of 17:47, 21 June 2006

Lacan's works abound in references to the famous phrase by Descartes, cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am").[1]

This phrase (which Lacan often refers to simply as 'the cogito') comes to stand, in Lacan's work, for Descartes's entire philosophy.

Lacan's attitude to Cartesianism is extremely complex, and only a few of the most important points can be summarised here.

1. On one level, the cogito comes to stand for the modern western concept of the Ego, based as it is on the notions of the self-sufficiency and self-transparency of consciousness, and the autonomy of the ego.[2]

Although Lacan does not believe that the modern western concept of the ego was invented by Descartes or by any other individual, he argues that it was born in the same era in which Descartes was writing (the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth century), and is particularly clearly expressed by Descartes.[3]

Thus, although this concept of the ego seems so natural and eternal to western man today, it is in fact a relatively recent cultural construct; its eternal-natural appearance is in fact an illusion produced by retroaction.[4]

Lacan argues that the experience of psychoanalytic treatment is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the Cogito.[5]

Freud's discovery of the unconscious subverts the Cartesian concept of subjectivity because it disputes the Cartesian equation subject = ego = consciousness.

One of Lacan's main criticisms of ego-psychology and object-relations theory is that these schools betrayed Freud's discovery by returning to the pre-Freudian concept of the subject as an autonomous ego.[6]

2. On another level, Lacan's views can be seen not only as a subversion of the cogito, but also as an extension of it, for the cogito not only encapsulates the false equation subject = ego = consciousness which Lacan opposes, but also focuses attention on the concept of the subject, which Lacan wishes to retain.

Thus the cogito contains within itself the seeds of its own subversion, by putting forward a concept of subjectivity which undermines the modern concept of the ego.

This concept of subjectivity refers to what Lacan calls "the subject of science": a subject who is denied all intuitive access to knowledge and is thus left with reason as the only path to knowledge.[7]

By opposing the subject to the ego, Lacan proposes that the subject of the Cartesian cogito is in fact one and the same as the subject of the unconscious.

Psychoanalysis can thus operate with a Cartesian method, advancing from doubt to certainty, with the crucial difference that it does not start from the statement "I think" but from the affirmation "it thinks."[8]

Lacan rewrites Descartes's phrase in various ways, such as "I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think."[9]

Lacan also uses the cogito to distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation.[10]

See Also

References

  1. ↑ 1637: 54
  2. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.6
  3. ↑ {{See S2, 6-7
  4. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.4-5
  5. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.1; Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.4
  6. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.l1
  7. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p.831; Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p.858
  8. ↑ Template:Sll p.35-6
  9. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.166
  10. ↑ Template:Sll p.138-42; see Template:Sl7 p.180-4
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