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The [[LacanEnglish]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the French translations of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish' by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish', which is closer to Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English translators have opted for the latter, since the English term 'desire' conveys, like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde as are carried by the [[French ]] term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of dÈsir ''désir'' and which make it '"a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud ]] himself' (."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80).</ref>

[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]]" is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p.275</ref>

<blockquote>"The motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p.228</ref>

<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>

However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''). "Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref> --- One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEED.  In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three concepts.  This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957 (see S4, 100-1, 125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c). --- Need is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied.  The [[human]] [[subject]], being born in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them.  In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]].  The primitive [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s.  However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s love]].

"Although the Hence [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speechdemand]]soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speechneed]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, and as a [[surplusdemand]], which exceeds for [[speechlove]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.36</ref>

One of Lacan's most important criticisms of <blockquote>"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the psychoanalytic theories of his day was difference that they tended to confuse results from the concept subtraction of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three conceptsfirst from the second. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957 (see S4, 100-1, 125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c)"<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote>

Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts [[Desire]] is thus the concept of desire completely out of surplus produced by the realm articulation of biology, is strongly reminiscent of KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire[[need]] in [[demand]]; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve, 1947: 6).

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed <blockquote>"Desire begins to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested take shape in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects margin in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire[[demand]] becomes separated from need. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a LACK"<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote>

One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire of the Other' (Sll, 235). This ]] can never be understood satisfied; it is constant in many complementary waysits pressure, of which the following are the most importantand eternal.

1. Desire is essentially 'desire The realisation of the Other's [[desire']] does not consist in being "fulfilled", which means both desire to be but in the object reproduction of another's desire, and [[desire for recognition by another]] as such. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who states:

2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that 'important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the object of man'[[drive]]s desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:

12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of Although they both belong to the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire field of the [[Other ]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this 'tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at whereas the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b: 12).This idea too is taken from KojËve'[[drive]]s reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6)are many.

The reason for this goes back to In other words, the [[drive]]s are the former point about human particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire being ]] (although there may also be [[desire for recognition; by desiring that ]]s which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make are not manifested in the other recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40[[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref>

This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric There is only one who sustains another person's [[object]] of [[desire]], converts another's desire into her own [[object (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr Kpetit) a]], thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what and this is important in the analysis of represented by a hysteric is not to find out the object variety of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies)partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s.

# Desire is desire for the Other The [[object (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition depetit). The fundamental desire a]] is not the incestuous [[object]] towards which [[desire for the mother]] tends, but the primordial Other (S7, 67).# Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is impossible to desire what one already has. The object [[cause]] of [[desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is a METONYMY (E, 175)]].

# [[Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

The first person to occupy the place One of the Other [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is the mother, and at first the child is at the mercy of her : "man's desire. It is only when the Father articulates desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX)Other."<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref>

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