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{{Topppp}}désir]]''
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|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}
The concept of [[desire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a [[theoretical]], [[ethical]] and [[clinical]] point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the [[concept]] is supported by, yet goes beyond, its [[Freudian]] origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the [[relationship]] between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].
<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]]. -->
==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[DesireFreud]] 's ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]]: translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'') by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a major ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[psychoanalytic theorydésir]]'' and which make it "a [[category]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->
By shifting the object of study from the imagery of the [[manifest]] [[content]] of the [[dream]] to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, Freud unveiled the [[structure]] of both the dream and [[The concept Subject|the subject]]. Beyond the [[preconscious]] wishes attached to a [[number]] of desirable [[desireobjects]] is that the central concern dream-[[work]] utilizes, there lies the unconscious wish — indestructible, [[infantile]] in its origins, the product of [[psychoanalytic repression]], permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other [theory[formations]]of the unconscious.
==Human Desire==The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its [[structural]] [[Lacanposition]]: it is the necessary, following not [[Spinozacontingent]], argues that "effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's [[psyche]]; the gap [[desireleft]]" is by a lost satisfaction (cf. the essence seventh chapter of manThe [[Interpretation]] of [[Dreams]]; Freud, 1953, pp."<ref>{{S11}} p509-621).275</ref>
Such a structural gap in the subject is of a [[Desiresexual]] is the heart of [[humanorder]] ; it corresponds ultimately to a [[existenceloss]], fundamental of sexual jouissance due to every aspect the fact of the [[psychicprohibition]] to which [[lifesexuality]] of is subjected in the human [[being]]. This prohibition is a structural [[cultural]] [[necessity]], not a [[individualcontingency]] , and to its [[subjective]] correlate is the [[socialOedipus]] [[systemcomplex]] in — which the is a [[individualnormative]] finds him organization, rather than a more or herself embeddedless typical set of [[psychological]] manifestations.
The [[Desiremodel]] provides of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[subjectOn Dreams|on dreams]] remained his [[guide]] for the rest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, it continued to inform, until the end, Freud's clinical interventions — [[interpretations]] with its primary motivation and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[frustrationthem]]. This model is inseparable from the [[form]] of [[discourse]] that Freud created: the rule of free [[association]], the subject's speech, reveals his/her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.
==DesireLacan's elaboration of the praxis ([[theory]] and [[practice]]) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and attempting to abbreviate it or replace the necessary [[reading]] with a [[summary]] would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, Need we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan's works) and Demand==further lines of enquiry.
A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan's work contains a [[LacanHegelian]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[reference, according to which desire]]* is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the [[needdifference]] between his and Hegel's positions (''besoin'')* [Lacan, 1977 [demand]1959] (''demande'', pp. 292-325) .
==Need==But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[transference]]-relation). In '[[The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis]]' (1953), Lacan writes:
The :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[humanmeaning]] in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first [[infantobject of desire]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require to be recognized by the other. (constant or periodic) [Lacan, 1977 [satisfaction]1959], p.58)
The That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[value]] later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is [[dialectical]], that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of humandesire. Human desire is the desire of the Other (over and above the [[others]] who are [[infantconcrete]] has certain incarnations of the Other), not '[[biologicalnatural]] ', endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or [[needanother]]s which are satisfied irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desire is always inscribed in and mediated by certain language (cf. The Four Fundamental [[Concepts]] of [[objectPsycho]]s-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).
Lacan's study of the dialectical [[Neednature]] is a of desire led to his [[distinction]] between desire, need and demand. The [[biologicalthree]] [[instinctterms]] that requires (constant or periodic) describe lacks in the subject; yet it is indispensable to [[identify]] each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfactionof vital [[needs]]is subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.
The least noisy appeal of the infant is already inscribed in language, as it is [[Needinterpreted]] emerges according to by the requirements 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. This primordial discursive circuit makes of the organism and abates completely (infant already a [[speaking]] being, a subject of speech, even if only temporarily) when at the [[satisfiedstage]]in which he/she is still infant. This subordination to the Other through language marks the human forever.Lacan writes:
:The [[humanphenomenology]] that emerges from [[infantanalytic]] [[experience]] is born into certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[character]] by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a state presence or of an [[absence]] — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[helplessnesssatisfying]]needs, and that is unable to say, the [[satisfypower]] its own of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[biologicalsatisfied]] [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the [needs[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[Spaltung]]). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp.286-7)
The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] This residual status of desire constitutes its own [[needsessence]], must depend on ; at this point the question of the [[OtherObject of Desire|object of desire]] acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of this object to be his only original contribution to help it [[satisfy]] thempsychoanalysis.
The Although an exaggeration in [[Otherreality]] can help to , Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[satisfyrational]] critique of the [[neednotion]]s of the '[[infantobject relations]]' and its clinical applications.
The For what Lacan emphasized was the [[illusory]] nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is [[Otherreal]] can provide ; and it is in this gap that the [[objecta]]s which , the object [[subjectcause of desire]] requires to satisfy his , installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in [[needparticular]]s, chapter 20).
==Demand==Desire requires the support of the [[fantasy]], which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the [[fading]] subject faces the [[lost object]] thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.
The function This permanent [[displacement]] of desire follows the [[demandlogic]] of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is to serve its interpretation, as an articulation it moves along the [[chain]] of unconscious [[signifiers]], without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (cf. [[Seminar]] VI, '[[needDesire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, 1958-59).
The [[infant]], in order to get help from In the [[Otheranalytic experience]], desire 'must articulate be taken literally', as it is through the unveiling of the signifiers that support it (expressalbeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [[need1959]]s (vocally, pp. 256-77) in (the form of a) [[demand]].
The Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to ethical [[demandreflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[principle]] (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a [[barrier]] serves to bring jouissance - the jouissance of the drive (always [[Otherpartial]] , not in relation to help the [[body]] considered as a [[satisfytotality]] , but to the [[needsorganic]] function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), and that of the [[infantsuper-ego]](with its implacable command to [[enjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).
Thus, desire appears to be on the side of [[life]] preservation, as it opposes the lethal [[dimension]] of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [[living]] organism, and the [[demands]] of the [[superego]] - that `[[Demandsenseless]] law' - which result in the [[self]]-destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[guilt]]). But desire itself is also not without a structural relation with [[demanddeath]] for : death at the heart of the [[lovespeaking being]] 's lack-in-being (beyond manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the [[satisfactionworld]] of that entice desire, inducing its [[needalienation]]), without ever satisfying any promise.
The There is no Sovereign [[presenceGood]] that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or [[guarantee]] the subject's well-being. As a consequence, the [[Otherethics]] (becomes important in itself) of psychoanalysis require that the [[symbolizesanalyst]] does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only [[Otherthing]]'s of which one can be [[loveguilty]]is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992, p. 319).
The [[biological]] [[need]]analyst's of desire, 'a desire to obtain absolute difference', is the original [[infantLacanian]] becomes subordinated to concept that defines the [[demand]] for position of the analyst in [[recognitionanalytic discourse]] , and [[love]] represents a culmination of his elucidationof the [[Other]]function of desire in psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1977, p. 276; 1991).
The This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological [[needstate]]of the analyst. It is his/her lack-in-being, rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's which are articulated in [[demandDirection of the Treatment|direction of the treatment]] (Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an [[ideal]] for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a position of [[semblant]]of the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998). Only in this way may the analyst's are desire become the [[satisfiedinstrument]]of the analysand's access to his/her own desire.
The See also: [[Otherjouissance]] can provide the [[object]]s which the , [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.
The References[[OtherFreud, S.]] (can [1953) [satisfy]1900a] the [[needThe Interpretation of Dreams]]s that are articulated in . Standard Edition of the [[demandComplete]]s Psychological Works of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demandSigmund Freud]] for , Vols 4 & 5. [[loveLondon]]: Hogarth Press.
Even after #Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[Miller]]). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[needHamlet]]s which '. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are articulated unedited transcripts of the [[whole]] seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [demand[Sade]]s are '. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[satisfiedpsychanalyse]], 1969-1970. [[demandParis]] : Seuil.# Lacan, J. (as the 1992) [[demandThe Seminar]] for , Book VII, [[loveThe Ethics of Psychoanalysis]], 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) remains The Seminar, Book XX, [[Encore]], 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[Knowledge]]. New York: W.W. Norton. [[unsatisfiedLeonardo]]S. Rodriguez
=====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can [[claim]] to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s [[thought]], it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks [[about]] [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to, but always ''[[unconscious]]'' [[desire]]. This leftover is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]]as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref></blockquote> -->
=====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the [[full]] sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->
=====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to [[name]], to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[Desireexistence]] ."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is what remains not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[demandlanguage]] after . On the contrary, by articulating [[needdesire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]]s which are articulated in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[demanddesire]] are into [[satisfiedexistence]].)
<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[Desiredesire]] ; that is neither the appetite for efficacious [[satisfactionaction]]of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, nor the [[demandsubject]] for creates, brings forth, a new [[lovepresence]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from in the secondworld."<ref>{{ES2}} p.287228-9</ref></blockquote>
However, there is a [[limit]] to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[Desirespeech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the [[surplusirreducibility]] produced by of the articulation of [[needunconscious]] in (i.e. the fact the the [[demandunconscious]]is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').
<blockquote>"Although the [[Desiretruth]] about [[desire]] is [[present]] begins to take shape some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the margin in which whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[demandsurplus]] becomes separated from , which exceeds [[needspeech]]."<ref>{{EEvans}} p.31136</ref></blockquote>
=====Criticism=====One of [[DesireLacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, unlike but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[needThe Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, can never be 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]]". Trans. [[satisfiedAlan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91].</ref>
A =====Need=====[[needNeed]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]] , an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (that even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to [[help]] it [[satisfiedsatisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The [[primitive]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]]) ceases to motivate minister to the [[infant]] until another 's [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] arisesand as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains [[unsatisfied]], and this leftover is [[desire]].
[[<blockquote>"Desire]] is constant in its pressureneither the appetite for satisfaction, and eternalnor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p. 287</ref></blockquote>
=====Demand=====
[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]];
==<blockquote>"Desire of begins to take shape in the Other==margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from need."<ref>{{E}} p. 311</ref></blockquote>
Unlike a [[Lacanneed]] asserted that , which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is the constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of the [[Otherdesire]]as such.
=====Alexandre Kojève=====[[DesireLacan]] 's distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. [[James]] H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>
<blockquote>"=====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[Mandrive]]'s . Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many. In other [[words]], the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]] of s which are not manifested in the [[Otherdrive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p.235243</ref></blockquote> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of [[partial objects]] in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
The statement provides =====Desire of the basis for our consideration Other=====One of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of 's most oft-repeated [[subjectivityformulas]] and points to is: "man's desire is the fundamentally social character desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be [[desireunderstood]]in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.
==Object ===More=====1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's Desire==desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for [[recognition]] by another.
[[DesireLacan]] is the takes this [[desireidea]] for the from [[OtherHegel]]'s , via [[desireKojève]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]].who states:
[[<blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire]] . . . is , finally, a [[function of the desire]] for 'recognition'.<ref>[[recognitionAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]]' (by another1947 [1933-39])''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
The =====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a [[struggle]] for pure prestige (see [[master]]). That [[desire]] is essentially [[Oedipus complexdesire]] illustrates to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first '[[time]]' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
==Object Desired by Others===Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of [[the thing]] in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.
<blockquote>"The [[objectdesire]] of the [[manOther]]'s is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special [[desiresignificance]] of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number... is essentially an "<ref>{{L}} "[[objectSome Reflections on the Ego]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. 1951bVol. p34.1953[1951b]: 12</ref></blockquote>
The [[object]] This idea too is taken from [[desirableKojève]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because 's reading of [[otherHegel]]s ; [[desireKojève]] it.argues that:
It <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is qua [[Other]] human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[subjectAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [[desire1933-39]]s) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>{{E}} p.312</refblockquote>
It is <blockquote>The [[humanreason]] for this goes back to [[the former point about human desire being desire]] what others for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[desireAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] because they [(1947 [desire1933-39]] it) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>
==Desire for the Other===Hysteria=====This [[universal]] feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[Desirehysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. [[Dora]] desires Frau K because she [[identifies]] with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref> Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the [[place]] from which she [[desire]] for s (the [[Othersubject]]with whom she identifies).
=====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is [[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>
==Impossible # [[Desire==]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is [[impossible]] to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>
<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref> ==Social Desire== # [[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product.[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectical]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]]. ==Desire and Prohibition== <blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].) ==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment==The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his or her [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>In [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p.228</ref></blockquote> There is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]]."<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref> The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]]. <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. .i.e. In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>Evans 36</ref></blockquote> ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility. The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire. No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]]. ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s. The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desireunconscious]].
=====Social Product=====
The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that [[desire]] is a [[social]] product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of other [[subject]]s.
=====(M)other=====
The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the [[child]] is at the mercy of her [[desire]]. It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by [[castrating]] the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].
==See Also==
{{See}}
* [[Need]]
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* [[Drive]]
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* [[Demand]]
{{Also}}
==References==
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<references/>
[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]</div> {{OK}}[[Category:TermsSymbolic]][[Category:ConceptsReal]][[Category:PsychoanalysisMess]]
