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The [[distinction]] between doubt as an [[instrument]] of [[rational]] [[thought]] and pathological doubt was known to [[philosophers]] ([[Descartes]], [[Spinoza]]) long before [[Freud]], and had long been studied as a [[symptom]] or syndrome in [[psychiatry]]. Théodule Ribot defined doubt as "a [[conflict]] between two tendencies in thought, incompatible and antagonistic, without any possible reconciliation, into a succession of positive and [[negative]] judgments [[about]] the same [[subject]] that does not culminate in a conclusion" (1925). In his study on [[obsessional]] [[neurosis]], Freud noted that "[a]nother [[mental]] [[need]] . . . [[obsessional neurotics]] . . . is the need for uncertainty in their [[life]], or for doubt" (1909d, p. 232).
Freud first discussed doubt in his [[work]] on [[dreams]] where he saw it as a mark of [[resistance]] and an indication to the [[analyst]] of the [[significance]] of the [[repressed]] element to which it related. But for the most part Freud considered doubt in the context of [[Obsessional Neurosis|obsessional neurosis]], where it applied to events that had already occurred, and could be seen above all as an expression of [[ambivalence]], a [[repudiation]] of the [[instinct]] for [[mastery]] as sublimated into an instinct for [[knowledge]] (1913i, p. 324).
The etiology of doubt as a symptom is [[analyzed]] at length in the [[case]] [[history]] of the "[[Rat Man]]" (1909d). Freud summarized it in a [[letter]] of April 21, 1918, to Lou Andreas-Salomé: "The tendency to doubt arises not from any occasion for doubt, but is the continuation of the powerful ambivalent tendencies in the [[pregenital]] [[phase]], which from then on become attached to every pair of opposites that [[present]] themselves" (1966/1972, p. 77).
Obsessional thought, however, to characterize it more accurately, has [[three]] somewhat different aspects: uncertainty, [[hesitation]], and doubt. Uncertainty can be viewed as that voluntary blurring of references, which underpins the aversion for watches, for example. Doubt, for its part, is an [[internal]] [[perception]] of indecision, which just like hesitation is associated with the volitional sphere, whereas uncertainty belongs to the cognitive and doubt to the [[affective]]. These three aspects do not necessarily function simultaneously, as [[witness]] the fact that we can be certain yet unable to decide on [[action]]; at the same [[time]], action can overcome hesitation in the [[absence]] of the slightest certainty about the reasonableness of that decision. The [[essence]] of wisdom would be to achieve certainty before abandoning hesitation—the precise attribute obsessionals find it so hard to adopt (Mijolla-Mellor, 1992).
Apropos of the [[Rat man|Rat Man]], Freud mentions the "predilection for uncertainty" of obsessional neurotics who turn their [[thoughts]] to "those [[subjects]] upon which all mankind are uncertain and upon which our knowledge and judgments must necessarily remain open to doubt" (1909d, p. 232-33). This tendency extends to easily accessible knowledge, seemingly as a [[form]] of protection against the risk of [[knowing]]. In fact the obsessive neutralizes any [[idea]], any decision, by evoking its opposite. Thus hesitation and the predilection for uncertainty constitute the cognitive aspect of the [[impossibility]] of choosing, an attitude that serves to delay action indefinitely. The obsessive is paralyzed by ambivalence, immobilized by two [[instinctual]] impulses directed at the same [[object]].
What is the source of this ambivalence? Since it is too general a [[concept]] to determine the "[[choice]] of neurosis," Freud offered a hypothesis based on constitutional factors: "The [[sadistic]] components of [[love]] have, from constitutional causes, been exceptionally strongly developed." And in [[terms]] of [[individual]] history, these "have consequently undergone a premature and all too thorough [[suppression]]" (1909d, p. 240).
<references/>
# [[Freud, Sigmund]]. (1909d). [[Notes]] upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318.
# ——. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: a contribution to the problem of [[Choice of Neurosis|choice of neurosis]]. SE, 12: 311-326.
# Freud, Sigmund, and Andreas-Salomé, Lou. (1972). [[Sigmund Freud]] and Lou Andreas-Salomé; letters. (Ernst Pfeiffer, Ed. and William and Elaine Robson-Scott, Trans.). New York: Harcourt Brace. (Original work published 1966)
