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<h1 class="documentFirstHeading">I am a Fighting [[Atheist]]: Interview with Slavoj [[Zizek]]</h1>

<p>It's hard to become a superstar in the [[world ]] of scholarly publishing. Most of the [[people ]] who read its products can also write [[them]]. To stand out in a crowd this smart requires both luck and perseverance. [[Slavoj Zizek ]] has demonstrated plenty of both. When [[Yugoslavia ]] started to break up in the aftermath of the [[Cold War ]] in 1990, pristine [[Slovenia ]] was the first of its republics to declare independence. We were thrilled to be witnessing the rebirth of "nations" that had disappeared into [[Germany]], the [[Soviet Union]], or, in the [[case ]] of Slovenia, first the Austro-Hungarian [[Empire]], and then Yugoslavia. .As this little-known land's leading thinker, Zizek basked in an aura of novelty. His [[work]], simultaneously light-hearted and deep, invoked the [[dream ]] of a post-Cold War world in which free [[thinking ]] would transcend all borders.</p>

<p>A decade later, we [[know ]] how quickly that hope turned to despair. But Zizek's star hasn't dimmed. If anything, it has grown brighter. People who started [[reading ]] Zizek because they couldn't believe that [[Communist ]] [[Europe ]] could produce such a supple thinker read him now for the simple [[reason ]] that he is Zizek. For anyone who has tired of the dumbing down of mainstream [[political ]] [[discourse ]] in the West, who finds it hard to believe that the bone-dry American leftism of a Noam [[Chomsky ]] represents the only possibility for [[resistance]], who wants to critique [[global ]] [[capitalism ]] without falling back on faded [[Marxist ]] slogans, Zizek's work flashes the promise of something better. From his ground-breaking 1989 book <em>The [[Sublime ]] [[Object ]] of [[Ideology]]</em> to his trenchant 1999 critique of Western governments' [[intervention ]] in the former Yugoslavia, titled <em>[[NATO ]] as the [[Left ]] Hand of God?</em>, Zizek has never failed to stimulate thinking. And what more can we ask of an [[intellectual]]? As Zizek himself suggests in the interview here, [[philosophy ]] helps us, not by "purifying" our [[thought]], but by making it more [[complex]].</p>

<p>What really sets Zizek apart from [[other ]] major scholars is his willingness to take risks. If you were to read all of his books in rapid succession, you would see that they sometimes contradict one [[another]]. But you would also see how the tension between them reflects Zizek's [[real ]] [[purpose]]: to make us see the world with fresh eyes. Unlike the vast majority of academic thinkers, Zizek is not worried [[about ]] [[being ]] "careless." He roots around in the realm of [[ideas ]] [[looking ]] for whatever will prove useful. It doesn't matter if his findings come from different intellectual traditions, if they are, in some [[sense]], philosophically incompatible. Zizek's [[writing ]] forces them to collaborate. [[Marx]], [[Freud]], [[Hegel]], [[Kant]], [[Lacan]]...and Alfred [[Hitchcock]], [[David Lynch]], and the Slovenian electronic agit-prop band Laibach all come together in a delightful mix. This delight, finally, is what seals the deal for Zizek's readers. It's one [[thing ]] to illuminate contemporary political concerns with the [[help ]] of dense [[philosophical ]] points; it's another entirely to make that insight fun. Zizek does.</p>

<p><em>Left Business [[Observer]]</em> editor and <em>Wall Street</em> [[author ]] Doug Henwood talked with Zizek prior to the September 11th terrorist attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, then asked a few follow-up questions in its aftermath. In the days following the attack, Zizek's take on its [[significance ]] — an incredibly moving essay titled "Welcome to the Desert of [[the Real]]" circulated on e-mail lists worldwide. Unlike the vast majority of commentators, Zizek was not [[content ]] to express disbelief and outrage. His [[words ]] offered an antidote to the mindless drivel on the major networks, CNN, and Fox News. Reflecting on the many "previews" of the [[tragedy ]] in American movies, Zizek refused to blunt his critical edge: "In a way, America got what it fantasized about."</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> In general, anarchism plays a big [[role ]] in American radical [[politics ]] and countercultures. Do you have any [[thoughts ]] on this influence?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> I certainly can [[understand ]] where the appeal of anarchism lies. Even though I am quite aware of the contradictory and ambiguous [[nature ]] of Marx's [[relationship ]] with anarchism, Marx was [[right ]] when he drew attention to how anarchists who preach "no [[state ]] no [[power]]" in [[order ]] to realize their goals usually [[form ]] their own [[society ]] which obeys the most authoritarian rules. My first problem with anarchism is always, "Yeah, I agree with your goals, but tell me how you are organized." For me, the tragedy of anarchism is that you end up having an authoritarian [[secret ]] society trying to achieve [[anarchist ]] goals. The second point is that I have problems with how anarchism is appropriate to today's problems. I [[think ]] if anything, we [[need ]] more global organization. I think that the left should disrupt this equation that more global organization means more totalitarian [[control]].</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> When you [[speak ]] of a global organization, are you thinking of some kind of global state, or do you have non-state organizations in [[mind]]?</p>

<p><img src="Zizek-1.jpg" alt="cruising picture!" align="right" border="0" hspace="8" vspace="8"><strong>Zizek:</strong> I don't have any prejudices here whatever. For example, a lot of left-wingers dismissed talk of [[universal ]] [[human ]] rights as just another tool of American [[imperialism]], to exert pressure on [[Third ]] World countries or other countries America doesn't like, so it can bomb them. But it's not that simple. As we all know, following the same [[logic]], Pinochet was arrested. Even if he was set free, this provoked a tremendous [[psychological ]] [[change ]] in Chile. When he left Chile, he was a universally feared, grey eminence. He returned as an old man whom nobody was afraid of. So, instead of dismissing the rules, it's well worth it to play the [[game]]. One should at least strategically support the [[idea ]] of some kind of international court and then try to put it to a more progressive use.</p>

<p>America is already concerned about this. A few months ago, when the Senate was still under Republican control, it adopted a measure prohibiting any international court to have any jurisdiction over American citizens. You know they weren't talking about some Third World anti-imperialist court. They were talking about the [[Hague ]] court, which is dominated by Western Europeans. The same goes for many of these international [[agencies]]. I think we should take it all. If it's [[outside ]] the [[domain ]] of state power, OK. But sometimes, even if it's part of state power. I think the left should overcome this primordial [[fear ]] of state power, that because it's some form of control, it's bad.</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> You describe the [[internal ]] [[structure ]] of anarchist groups as being authoritarian. Yet, the [[model ]] popular with younger activists today is explicitly anti-hierarchical and consensus-oriented. Do you think there's something furtively authoritarian about such apparently freewheeling [[structures]]?</p>

<p><img src="Zizek-2.jpg" alt="cruising picture!" class="left" border="0" hspace="8" vspace="8"><strong>Zizek:</strong> Absolutely. And I'm not bluffing here; I'm talking from personal [[experience]]. Maybe my experience is too narrow, but it's not limited to some mysterious [[Balkan ]] region. I have contacts in England, [[France]], Germany, and more — and all the [[time]], beneath the mask of this consensus, there was one person accepted by some unwritten rules as the secret [[master]]. The [[totalitarianism ]] was absolute in the sense that people pretended that they were equal, but they all obeyed him. The catch was that it was prohibited to state clearly that he was the boss. You had to fake some kind of equality. The real state of affairs couldn't be articulated. Which is why I'm deeply distrustful of this "let's just coordinate this in an egalitarian fashion." I'm more of a pessimist. In order to safeguard this equality, you have a more sinister [[figure ]] of the master, who puts pressure on the [[others ]] to safeguard the purity of the non-hierarchic [[principle]]. This is not just [[theory]]. I would be happy to hear of groups that are not caught in this strange [[dialectic]].</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> We've seen over the last few years the growth of a broad anti-[[capitalist ]] — or as we say in the U.S., anti-corporate or anti-[[globalization ]] — movement, a lot of it organized according to anarchist principles. Do you think these demonstrations are a [[sign ]] of any left revival, a new movement?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> Mixed. Not in the sense of being partly [[good ]] and partly bad but because the [[situation ]] is undecided — maybe even undecidable. What will come out of the Seattle movement is the terrain of the [[struggle]]. I think it is PRECISELY NOW — after the attack on the World Trade Center — that the "Seattle" task will regain its [[full ]] urgency! After a period of enthusiasm for retaliation, there will be a new ([[ideological]]) [[depression]], and THAT point will be our [[chance]]!!!</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> Much of this will depend on progressives' ability to get the [[word ]] out.</p>

<p><strong>Zizek</strong>: I'm well aware of the big [[media]]'s [[censorship ]] here. For example, even in the European big media, which are supposed to be more open, you will never see a detailed examination of the movement's agenda. You get some ominous things. There is something dark about it. According to the normal rules of the [[liberal ]] game, you would expect some of these people to be invited on some TV talk shows, confronted with their adversaries, placed in a vigorous polemic, but no. Their agenda is ignored. Usually they're mocked as advocating some old-fashioned [[left-wing ]] politics or some particularism, like saving local [[conditions ]] against globalism. My conclusion is that the big powers must be at least in some kind of a [[panic]]. This is a good sign.</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> But lots of the movement has no [[explicit ]] agenda to offer. Why is the [[elite ]] in such a panic?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> It's not like these are some kind of old-fashioned left-wing idiots, or some kind of local traditionalists. I am well aware that Seattle etc. is still a movement finding its shape, but I think it has potential. (Even though) there is no explicit agenda, there is nonetheless an outlook reproaching <em>this</em> globalization for being too exclusionary, not a [[true ]] globalization but only a capitalist globalization.</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> At the same time this movement was growing, there was a string of electoral victories for the right — Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia in Italy, Jorg Haider's [[Freedom ]] Party in [[Austria]], our own [[Bush]]. What do you make of these?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> They're not to be underestimated. I'll put it in my old-fashioned Stalinist [[terms]]: there are two deviations to be avoided here, left and right. The [[right-wing ]] deviation is to fully endorse their liberal opponents, to say, "OK, we have our problems with Gore or Blair but they're basically our guys, and we should support them against the true right." We should also avoid the opposite mistake, which is that they're all the same. It doesn't really matter if it's Gore or Bush. From this [[position ]] it's only one step to the position that says, "so it's even better we have Bush, because then we see the true [[enemy]]."</p>

<p>We should steer the right middle course: while maintaining our critical distance towards the moderate left, one shouldn't be afraid when certain issues are at stake, to support them. What is at stake is the following: it looked in the 1990s that after the disintegration of [[socialism]], the [[Third Way ]] left represents the universal interests of [[capital ]] as such, to put it in the old Marxist way, and the right-wing parties [[represent ]] only [[particular ]] interests. In the U.S., the Republicans target certain types of rich people, and even certain parts of the lower classes — flirting with the [[Moral ]] Majority, for example. The problem is that right-wing politicians such as Haider are playing the global game. Not only do we have a Third Way left; we now have a Third Way right too, which tries to combine unrestrained global capitalism with a more [[conservative ]] [[cultural ]] politics.</p>

<p>Here is where I see the long-term [[danger ]] of these right wingers. I think that sooner or later the existing [[power structure ]] will be [[forced ]] more and more to directly violate its own [[formal ]] democratic rules. For example, in Europe, the tendency behind all these movements like [[Holocaust ]] revisionism and so on, is an attempt to dismantle the post-[[World War II ]] ideological consensus around anti-[[fascism]], with a [[social ]] [[solidarity ]] built around the [[welfare ]] state. It's an open question as to what will replace it.</p>

<p>[*Ed Note: Such as the new emergency powers granted the U.S. [[government ]] for domestic surveillance purposes following the WTC/Pentagon attacks, which suspend habeas corpus rights for immigrants, allow security services to monitor your telecommunications activities, and review your student and bank records without permission from a judge]</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> What about the transition from [[Clinton ]] to Bush? What's significant about this from your point of view?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> The sad thing is that Clinton left behind him a devastated, disoriented [[Democratic Party]]. There are people who say that his departure leaves some room for a resurgence of the party's left wing, but that will be difficult. The true problem of Clinton is his legacy; there is none. He didn't survive as a movement, in the sense that he left a long-term imprint. He was just an opportunist and now he's simply out. He didn't emerge as a figure like Thatcher or [[Reagan ]] who left a certain legacy. OK, you can say that he left a legacy of compromise or triangulation, but the big failure is at this ideological level. He didn't leave behind a platform with which the moderate [[liberals ]] could [[identify]].</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> A lot of readers of American underground publications read [[Noam Chomsky ]] and Howard Zinn, and the stuff coming out of small anarchist presses. What would they get from reading your work that they might be [[missing]]?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> Martin [[Heidegger ]] said that philosophy doesn't make things easier, it makes them harder and more complicated. What they can learn is the ambiguity of so many situations, in the sense that whenever we are presented by the big media with a simple opposition, like multicultural [[tolerance ]] vs. ethnic [[fundamentalism]], the opposition is never so clear-cut. The idea is that things are always more complex. For example, multiculturalist tolerance, or at least a certain type of it, generates or involves a much deeper [[racism]]. As a rule, this type of tolerance relies on the [[distinction ]] between us multiculturalists, and intolerant ethnic others, with the paradoxical result that [[anti-racism ]] itself is used to dismiss IN A RACIST WAY the other as a racist. Not to mention the fact that this kind of "tolerance" is as a rule patronizing. Its respect for the other cannot but remind us of the respect for naive [[children]]'s beliefs: we leave them in their blessed [[ignorance ]] so as not to hurt them...</p>

<p>Or take Chomsky. There are two problematic features in his work — though it goes without saying that I admire him very much. One is his anti-theorism. A friend who had lunch with him recently told me that Chomsky announced that he'd concluded that [[social theory ]] and [[economic ]] theory are of no use — that things are simply evident, like American state [[terror]], and that all we need to know are the facts. I disagree with this. And the second point is that with all his criticism of the U.S., Chomsky retains a certain commitment to what is the most elemental ingredient of American ideology, individualism, a fundamental [[belief ]] that America is the land of free individuals, and so on. So in that way he is deeply and problematically American.</p>

<p>You can see some of these problems in the famous Faurisson scandal in France. As many readers may know, Chomsky wrote the preface for a book by Robert Faurisson, which was threatened with being banned because it denied the [[reality ]] of the Holocaust. Chomsky claimed that though he opposes the book's content, the book should still be published for free [[speech ]] reasons. I can see the argument, but I can't support him here. The argument is that freedom of the press is freedom for all, even for those whom we find disgusting and totally unacceptable; otherwise, today it is them, tomorrow it is us. It sounds [[logical]], but I think that it avoids the true [[paradox ]] of freedom: that some limitations have to [[guarantee ]] it.</p>

<p>So to understand what goes on today — to understand how we experience ourselves, to understand the structures of social [[authority]], to understand whether we really live in a "permissive" society, and how prohibitions function today — for these we need social theory. That's the [[difference ]] between me and the names you mentioned.</p>

<p><img src="Zizek-3.jpg" alt="cruising picture!" align="right" border="0" hspace="8" vspace="8"><strong>Zizek:</strong> Let me give you a very naive answer. I think that basically the facts are already known. Let's take Chomsky's [[analyses ]] of how the CIA intervened in Nicaragua. OK, (he provides) a lot of details, yes, but did I learn anything fundamentally new? It's exactly what I'd expected: the CIA was playing a very dirty game. Of course it's more convincing if you learn the dirty details. But I don't think that we really learned anything dramatically new there. I don't think that merely "[[knowing ]] the facts" can really change people's perceptions.</p>

<p>To put it another way: Chomsky's own position on Kosovo, on the Yugoslav war, shows some of his limitations, because of a [[lack ]] of a proper historical context. With all his facts, he got the picture wrong. As far as I can judge, Chomsky bought a certain [[narrative ]] — that we shouldn't put all the blame on [[Milosevic]], that all parties were more or less to blame, and the West supported or incited this explosion because of its own geopolitical goals. All are not the same. I'm not saying that the Serbs are [[guilty]]. I just [[repeat ]] my old point that Yugoslavia was not over with the secession of Slovenia. It was over the [[moment ]] Milosevic took over Serbia. This triggered a totally different [[dynamic]]. It is also not true that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was supported by the West. On the contrary, the West exerted enormous pressure, at least until 1991, for ethnic groups to remain in Yugoslavia. I saw [former Secretary of State] [[James ]] Baker on Yugoslav TV supporting the Yugoslav [[army]]'s attempts to prevent Slovenia's secession.</p>

<p>The ultimate paradox for me is that because he [[lacks ]] a [[theoretical ]] framework, Chomsky even gets the facts wrong sometimes.</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> The reason I liked them at a certain moment (which was during the last years of "really existing socialism") was that they were a third [[voice]], a disturbing voice, not fitting into the opposition between the old Communists and the new liberal [[democrats]]. For me, their [[message ]] was that there were fundamental mechanisms of power which we couldn't get rid of with the simple passage to [[democracy]]. This was a disturbing message, which was why they got on everyone's nerves. This was no abstract theoretical [[construct]]. In the late 1980s, people got this message instinctively — which is why Laibach were more strongly [[repressed ]] by the new democratic, nationalist powers in Slovenia than previously by the Communists. In the early 1980s, they had some trouble with the Communists, but from the mid-1980s onward, they didn't have any trouble. But they did again with the transition of power. With their mocking [[rituals ]] of totalitarian power, they transmitted a certain message about the functioning of power that didn't fit the naive belief in liberal democracy. The miracle was that they did it through certain [[stage ]] rituals. Later, they tried to change their [[image ]] (to put it in marketing terms) and they failed.</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> You talk and write a lot about popular [[culture]], particularly movies. How does your thinking about pop culture relate to your thinking about politics?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> We can no longer, as we did in the good old [[times]], (if they were really good) oppose the [[economy ]] and culture. They are so intertwined not only through the commercialization of culture but also the culturalization of the economy. Political [[analysis ]] today cannot bypass mass culture. For me, the basic ideological attitudes are not found in big picture philosophical statements, but instead in lifeworld practices — how do you behave, how do you react — which aren't only reflected in mass culture, but which are, up to a point, even generated in mass culture. Mass culture is the central ideological battlefield today.</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> You have recently been [[speaking ]] about reviving [[Lenin]]. To a lot of politically [[active ]] young people, Lenin is a devil figure. What do you find valuable in Lenin, or the Leninist [[tradition]]?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> I am careful to speak about not [[repeating ]] Lenin. I am not an idiot. It wouldn't mean anything to [[return ]] to the Leninist [[working ]] [[class ]] party today. What interests me about Lenin is precisely that after World War I broke out in 1914, he found himself in a [[total ]] deadlock. Everything went wrong. All of the social democratic parties outside [[Russia ]] supported the war, and there was a mass outbreak of patriotism. After this, Lenin had to think about how to reinvent a radical, revolutionary politics in this situation of total breakdown. This is the Lenin I like. Lenin is usually presented as a great follower of Marx, but it is impressive how often you read in Lenin the ironic line that "about this there isn't anything in Marx." It's this purely [[negative ]] parallel. Just as Lenin was forced to reformulate the entire socialist [[project]], we are in a similar situation. What Lenin did, we should do today, at an even more radical level.</p>

<p>For example, at the most elementary level, Marx's [[concept ]] of exploitation presupposes a certain labor theory of [[value]]. If you take this away from Marx, the [[whole ]] edifice of his model disintegrates. What do we do with this today, given the importance of intellectual labor? Both standard solutions are too easy — to [[claim ]] that there is still real [[physical ]] production going on in the Third World, or that today's programmers are a new [[proletariat]]? Like Lenin, we're deadlocked. What I like in Lenin is precisely what scares people about him — the ruthless will to discard all prejudices. Why not [[violence]]? Horrible as it may sound, I think it's a useful antidote to all the aseptic, [[frustrating]], politically correct pacifism.</p>

<p>Let's take the campaign against smoking in the U.S. I think this is a much more suspicious phenomenon than it appears to be. First, deeply inscribed into it is an idea of absolute [[narcissism]], that whenever you are in contact with another person, somehow he or she can infect you. Second, there is an [[envy ]] of the intense [[enjoyment ]] of smoking. There is a certain [[vision ]] of [[subjectivity]], a certain falseness in [[liberalism]], that comes down to "I [[want ]] to be left alone by others; I don't want to get too close to the others." Also, in this fight against the tobacco companies, you have a certain kind of politically correct yuppie who is doing very well financially, but who wants to retain a certain anti-capitalist aura. What better way to focus on the obvious bad guy, Big Tobacco? It functions as an ersatz enemy. You can still claim your stock [[market ]] gains, but you can say, "I'm against tobacco companies." Now I should make it clear that I don't smoke. And I don't like tobacco companies. But this [[obsession ]] with the danger of smoking isn't as simple as it might appear.</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> You've also left some of your readers scratching their heads over the positive things you've been writing about [[Christianity ]] lately. What is it in Christianity you find worthy?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek</strong>: I'm tempted to say, "The Leninist part." I am a fighting atheist. My leanings are almost [[Maoist ]] ones. Churches should be turned into grain silos or palaces of culture. What Christianity did, in a religiously mystified version, is give us the idea of rebirth. Against the pagan [[notion ]] of destiny, Christianity offered the possibility of a radical opening, that we can find a zero point and clear the table. It introduced a new kind of [[ethics]]: not that each of us should do our [[duty ]] according to our [[place ]] in society — a good King should be a good King, a good servant a good servant — but instead that irrespective of who I am, I have direct access to [[universality]]. This is explosive. What interests me is only this [[dimension]]. Of course it was later taken over by secular [[philosophers ]] and progressive thinkers. I am not in any way defending the [[Church ]] as an institution, not even in a minimal way.</p>

<p>For an example, let's take [[Judith ]] [[Butler]], and her [[thesis ]] that our [[sexual ]] [[identity ]] isn't part of our nature but is socially constructed. Such a [[statement]], such a [[feminist ]] position, could only occur against a background of a [[Christian ]] [[space]].</p>

<p><strong>BS:</strong> Several times you've used the word "[[universalism]]." For trafficking in such [[concepts]], people you'd identify as forces of [[political correctness ]] have indicted you for Eurocentrism. You've even written a radical [[leftist ]] plea for Eurocentrism. How do you respond to the PC camp's charges against you?</p>

<p><strong>Zizek:</strong> I think that we should accept that universalism is a Eurocentrist notion. This may sound racist, but I don't think it is. Even when Third World countries appeal to freedom and democracy, when they formulate their struggle against European imperialism, they are at a more radical level endorsing the European premise of universalism. You may [[remember ]] that in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the ANC always appealed to universal [[Enlightenment ]] values, and it was Buthelezi, the [[regime]]'s black supporter in the pay of the CIA, who appealed to special African values.</p>

<p>My opponent here is the widely accepted position that we should leave behind the quest for universal [[truth ]] — that what we have instead are just different narratives about who we are, the stories we tell about ourselves. So, in that view, the highest [[ethical ]] [[injunction ]] is to respect the other story. All the stories should be told, each ethnic, political, or sexual group should be given the right to tell its story, as if this kind of tolerance towards the [[plurality ]] of stories with no universal truth value is the ultimate ethical horizon.</p>

<p>I oppose this radically. This ethics of storytelling is usually accompanied by a right to narrate, as if the highest act you can do today is to narrate your own story, as if only a black lesbian [[mother ]] can know what it's like to be a black lesbian mother, and so on. Now this may sound very emancipatory. But the moment we accept this logic, we enter a kind of apartheid. In a situation of social domination, all narratives are not the same. For example, in Germany in the 1930s, the narrative of the [[Jews ]] wasn't just one among many. This was the narrative that explained the truth about the entire situation. Or today, take the gay struggle. It's not enough for gays to say, "we want our story to be heard." No, the gay narrative must contain a universal dimension, in the sense that their implicit claim must be that what happens to us is not something that concerns only us. What is happening to us is a [[symptom ]] or [[signal ]] that tells us something about what's wrong with the entirety of society today. We have to insist on this universal dimension. </p>

<p><tt>Slavoj Zizek, [[philosopher ]] and [[psychoanalyst]], is currently Senior Researcher at Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, in Essen, Germany. His latest publications are<em> [[On Belief]]</em>, (Routledge, 2001) and <em>[[Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism]]?</em> (Verso, 2001).</tt></p>

<p><tt><span class="link-mailto"><a href="mailto:cbertsch@u.arizona.edu">Charlie Bertsch</a></span> is a member of the Bad [[Subjects ]] Production Team and an assistant professor of [[English ]] at the [[University ]] of Arizona.</tt></p>

[[[Category]]:Slavoj Žižek]]