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However, as with [[Freud]], [[Lacan]]'s declarations of [[materialism]] are highly complex. It is clear in [[Lacan]]'s earliest statements on the subject that he conceives of [[materialism]] in a very particular way. In 1936, for example, he argues that [[materialism]] does not imply a rejection of the categories of intentionality and meaning,<ref>{{Ec}} p.76-8</ref> and he rejects the simplistic idea of 'matter' as "a naive form which has been left behind by authentic materialism."<ref>{{Ec}} p.90</ref>
In 1946 he repeatedly criticizes the crude form of [[materialism]] which regards thought as a mere "epiphenomenon."<ref>{{Ec}} p.159</ref> And in 1956 he distinguishes between a "naturalist materialism" and a "Freudian materialism".<ref>{{Ec}} p.465-6</ref>
