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 [[semblance]] ([[French]]: ''[[{{Top}}semblant]]'') {{Bottom}}

Running throughout [[Lacan]]'s [[work ]] is the [[idea ]] that appearances are deceptive, an idea that is closely connected to the classical philosophical opposition between [[appearance]] and [[essence]].<ref>{{S11}} p.103ff103</ref>

The very [[distinction ]] between the [[imaginary]] and the [[symbolic]] implies this opposition between [[appearance]] and [[essence]].

The [[imaginary]] is the realm of observable phenomena which act as. bres[[lure]]s, while the [[symbolic]] is the realm of underlying [[structure]]s which cannot be observed but which must be deduced.

This opposition informs all [[scientific ]] enquiry, a basic presupposition of which is that the [[scientist]] must attempt to penetrate through [[false]] [[appearance]] into the hidden [[reality]].

SimilatrlySimilarly, in [[psychoanalysis]], as in [[science]], "only he who escapes from false appearances can achieve truth."<ref>{{S7}} p.310</ref>

For the [[natural]] [[scientist]], the [[false]] [[appearance]] lacks [[lack]]s the [[dimension ]] of deliberate [[deception]], which is why [[Lacan]] states that the axiom of [[natural science]] is the [[belief]] in an honest, non-deceitful [[God]].<ref>{{S3}} p.64</ref>

[[Lacan]] uses two [[terms ]] to refer to [[false]] [[appearance]]s.

The term ''[[apparence]]'' is that used in [[philosophical]] discussions of the distinction between [[essence]] and [[appearance]].

The term ''[[semblant]]'' is less technical, but acquires a growing importance in [[Lacan]]'s work over the years.

It appears as early as 1957,<ref>e.g. {{Ec}} p.435; {{S4}} p.207</ref> and is used several [[times ]] in the [[seminar]] of 1964,<ref>{{S11}} p.107</ref> but it is not until the early 1970s that the term comes to occupy an important [[place ]] in [[Lacan]]'s [[theoretical]] [[vocabulary]].

Later on, [[Lacan]] uses the term to characterise characterize general features of the [[symbolic]] [[order ]] and its relations to the [[imaginary]] and the [[real]].

Thus [[Lacan]] devotes his 1970-1 [[seminar]] to "a [[discourse ]] that would not be semblance," in which he argues that [[truth]] is not simply the opposite of [[appearance]], but is in fact continuous with it; [[truth]] and [[appearance]] are like the two sides of a [[moebius strip]], which are in fact only one side.

In the [[seminar]] of 1972-3, [[Encore]], [[Lacan]] goes on to [[state ]] that ''[[objet petit a]]'' is a "semblance of [[being]],"<ref>{{S20}} p.84</ref> that [[love]] is addressed to a [[semblance]],<ref>{{S20}} p.85</ref> and that ''[[jouissance]]'' is only evoked or elaborated on the basis of a [[semblance]].<ref>{{S20}} p.85</ref>

* [[RealityDeception]]||

* ''[[TruthJouissance]]''||* [[Mirror stage]]* [[Moebius strip]]||

* [[DeceptionTruth]]* [[Moebius Strip]]* ''[[Jouissance]]''{{Also}}