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{{BSZ}} The excitation and the sense of urgency caused by the daily reports on violent demonstrations against the perpetrators of Muhammed caricatures is on the wane. The time has come to look back (as well as into the future, of course) and draw a balance.<br><br>
The irony not to be missed is that 99.99% of the thousands who feel offended and demonstrate had never even SEEN the Danish caricatures. This fact confronts us with another, less attractive, aspect of globalization: the “global informational village” is the condition of the fact that something that took place in an obscure daily in Denmark caused such a violent stir in the far-away Muslim countries – it was as if Denmark and Syria (and Pakistan and Egypt and Iraq and Lebanon and Indonesia and…) are <i>neighboring</i> countries. This is what those who see globalization as the chance for the entire earth as a unified space of communication, bringing together all humanity, fail to notice: since a Neighbor is (as Freud suspected long ago) primarily a Thing, a traumatic intruder, someone whose different way of life (or, rather, way of <i>jouissance</i> materialized in its social practices and rituals) disturb us, throw off the rails the balance of our way of life, when the Neighbor comes too close, this can also give rise to aggressive reaction aimed at getting rid of this disturbing intruder – or, as Peter Sloterdijk put it: “More communication means at first above all more conflict.” <a title="" name="_ftnref1" href="#_ftn1">[1]</aref>Peter Sloterdijk, “Warten auf den Islam,” <bri>Focus<br/i> This is why the attitude of “understanding-each-other” has to be supplemented by the attitude of “getting-out-of-each-other’s-way10/2006,” by maintaining an appropriate distance, by a new “code of discretionp.” European civilization finds it easier to tolerate different ways of life precise on account of what its critics usually denounce as its weakness and failure, namely the “alienation” of social life.” Alienation means (also) that distance is included into the very social texture: even if I live side by side with others, the normal state is to ignore them. I am allowed not to get too close to others; I move in a social space where I interact with others obeying certain external “mechanical” rules, without sharing their “inner world” – and, perhaps, the lesson to be learned is that, sometimes, a dose of alienation is indispensable for the peaceful coexistence of ways of life. Sometimes, alienation is not a problem but a solution: globalization will turn explosive not if we remain isolated of each other, but, on the opposite, if we get too close to each other84.<br><br/ref>
It is here that Yeats’ diagnosis falls short: the passionate intensity of a mob bears witness to a lack of true conviction. The fundamentalist Islamic terror is NOT grounded in the terrorists’ conviction of their superiority and in their desire to safeguard their cultural-religious identity from the onslaught of the global consumerist civilization: the problem with fundamentalists is not that we consider them inferior to us, but, rather, that THEY THEMSELVES secretly consider themselves inferior (like, obviously, Hitler himself felt towards Jews) – which is why our condescending Politically Correct assurances that we feel no superiority towards them only makes them more furious and feeds their resentment. The problem is not cultural difference (their effort to preserve their identity), but the opposite fact that the fundamentalists are already like us, that, secretly, they have already internalized our standards and measure themselves by them. Paradoxically, what the fundamentalists really lack is precisely a dosage of true “racist” conviction of one’s own superiority. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s well-known distinction between <blockquotei>amour-de-soi<p align="justify"/i>and <i>amour-propre</i> is more than pertinent here:
<font color="#4a647b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"blockquote>The primitive passions, which all directly tend towards our happiness, make us deal only with objects which relate to them, and whose principle is only amour de soi, are all in their essence lovable and tender; however, when, <i>diverted from their objects by obstacles, they are more occupied with the obstacle they try to get rid of, than with the object they try to reach, </i>they change their nature and become irascible and hateful. This is how amour de soi, which is a noble and absolute feeling, becomes amour-propre, that is to say, a relative feeling by means of which one compares oneself, a feeling which demands preferences, <i>whose enjoyment is purely negative and which does not strive to find satisfaction in our own well-being, but only in the misfortune of others</i>. <a title="" name="_ftnref2" href="#_ftn2"ref>[2]</ai>Rousseau, juge de Jean-Jacques</font></fonti>, first dialogue.</pref></blockquote>
<b>Antinomies of Tolerant Reason</b><br><br>
Immanuel Kant developed the notion of the “antinomies of pure reason”: all reason inevitably falls into self contradiction when it attempts to go beyond our concrete sensible experience to address such questions as: "Does the Universe have a beginning in time, a limit in space, an initial cause, or is it infinite?" The antimony arises because it is possible to construct valid arguments to argue both sides of the question: we can conclusively demonstrate that the universe is finite <i>and</i> that it is infinite… Kant argues that if this conflict of reason is not resolved that humanity would lapse into hopeless skepticism which he called the "euthanasia of pure reason." The reactions to the Muslim outrage at the Danish caricatures of Mohammad seem to confront us with a similar antinomy of tolerant reason: two opposite stories can be told about the caricatures, each of them convincing and well-argued for, without any mediation or reconciliation between them.<br><br> On the one hand, for a Western liberal for whom the freedom of the press is one of the highest values, the case is clear. Even if we reject in disgust the caricatures, their publication in no way justifies murderous mob violence and the stigmatization of a whole country. Some companies already caught up with the new rules of the game – among others, Nestle and Carrefour. Nestle now emphasizes that no milk of Danish cows is used in their products. The French supermarket chain Carrefour in Egypt informs their “dear clients” that out of “solidarity” with Islamic community they “don’t carry Danish products.” The horror is that they both accepted the stigmatization of a whole country. Going even a step further, the Slovene president apologized to Muslims on behalf of “European civilization” itself!<br><br>
A further proof of this fact is the strange inconsistency in their reference to the holocaust. The Jordanian newspaper <blockquotei>Ad-Dustur<p align="justify"><font color="#4a647b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3"/i>Some European countries insist published on saying October 19 2003 a cartoon depicting the railroad to the death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau, with Israeli flags replacing the Nazi ones; the sign in Arabic reads: “Gaza Strip or the Israeli Annihilation Camp.” This idea that Hitler killed millions Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians have been comparable to Nazi actions towards Jews strangely contradicts the holocaust denial. Are we not witnessing here yet another example of innocent Jews the joke evoked by Freud in furnacesorder to render the strange logic of dreams: (1) I never borrowed a kettle from you; (2) I returned it to you unbroken; (3) the kettle was already broken when I got it from you. Such an enumeration of inconsistent arguments, of course, and they insist on confirms <i>per negationem</i> what it endeavors to deny – that I returned you a broken kettle… Does the same inconsistency not characterize the extent that if anyone proves something contrary way radical Islamists respond to thatthe holocaust? (1) Holocaust did not happen. (2) It did happen, they condemn that person and throw them in jailbut the Jews deserved it. /…/ Although we don't accept this claim, if we suppose (3) The Jews did not deserve it is true, our question for but they themselves lost the Europeans is: Is the killing of innocent Jewish people right to complain by Hitler doing to Palestinians what the reason for their support Nazis did to the occupiers of Jerusalem? /…/ If the Europeans are honest they should give some of their provinces them. Speaking in Europe, like Mecca in GermanyDecember 2005, Austria or other the Iranian president Ahmadinejad implied that guilt for the holocaust led European countries, to support the Zionists, and establishment of the Zionists can establish their state in Europe. You offer part State of Europe, and we will support it."</font></font></p></blockquote>Israel:
<p align="justify"blockquote><font color="#4a647b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">This statement is the mixture of the most disgusting and of a correct insight. The disgusting part is, of course, holocaust denial or, even more problematically, the claim Some European countries insist on saying that Jews deserved it (“we don’t accept this claim”: which one? That Hitler killed million millions of innocent Jews <i>or in furnaces, and they insist on it to the extent that if anyone proves something contrary to that, they condemn that the Jews were innocent</i> person and did not deserve to be killed?)throw them in jail. What /…/ Although we don't accept this claim, if we suppose it is correct about true, our question for the quoted statement Europeans is : Is the reminder killing of European hypocrisy: innocent Jewish people by Hitler the European manoeuvre effectively was reason for their support to pay for its own guilt with another people’s land. So when the Israeli government spokesman Raanan Gissin said occupiers of Jerusalem? /…/ If the Europeans are honest they should give some of their provinces in responseEurope, "Just to remind Mr. Ahmadinejadlike in Germany, we've been here long before his ancestors were here. ThereforeAustria or other countries, we have a birthright to be here the Zionists, and the Zionists can establish their state in the land Europe. You offer part of our forefathers Europe, and to live here,we will support it." he evoked a historical right which, when applied universally, would lead to universal slaughter. Alain Badiou recently addressed this impasse:</font></font></pblockquote>
<blockquote>The founding of a Zionist State was a mixed, thoroughly complex, reality. On the one side, it is an event which is part of a larger event: the rise of great revolutionary, communist and socialist projects. The idea to found an entirely new society. On the other side, it is a counter-event, which is part of a larger counter-event: colonialism, the brutal conquest, by the people who came from Europe, of the new land where other people, other peoples, live. This creation is an extraordinary mixture of revolution and reaction, of emancipation and oppression. The Zionist State should become what it had in it of being just and new. It has to become the least racial, the least religious, and the least nationalist of States. The most universal of them all.<ref>Alain Badiou, <i>Circonstances, 3. Portees du mot “juif,”</i> Paris: Lignes 2005, p. 89-90.</ref></blockquote>
So why should we, as Badiou proposes, <i>abstract</i> from the holocaust when we judge the Israeli politics towards Palestinians? Not because one can compare the two, but precisely because the holocaust <i>was</i> an incomparably stronger crime. It is those who evoke holocaust that effectively manipulate it, instrumentalizing it for today’s political uses. The very need to evoke holocaust in defense of the Israeli acts secretly implies that Israel is committing such horrible crimes that only the absolute trump-card of holocaust can redeem them.<br><br>
Udi Aloni’s <i>Forgiveness</i> (2005) is a fiction movie based on one of those crazy historical coincidences: in order to arouse panic among the Palestinians and make them flee during the 1949 war, the Israeli army killed the population of a small Palestinian village in the suburb of Jerusalem and razed to ground all houses; afterwards, they built on these grounds a psychiatric hospital for the survivors of the holocaust (later for the victims of the terrorist kidnappings). The hypothesis of the film is that the patients are haunted by the ghosts of those who are buried beneath the ground of the hospital, in an example of what Gilles Deleuze referred to as the atemporal superimposition of historical moments in the crystal-image. The irony is shattering: those most sensitive to the ghosts of the killed Palestinians are the very survivors of the holocaust (the film plays with the fact that the living dead in the camps were called Muslims, <i>Musulmannen</i>). Aloni neither elevates the holocaust into the Absolute Crime which somehow legitimizes Israeli activity in the occupied zones, allowing the Israelis to dismiss all criticism of the Israeli politics as secretly motivated by the holocaust-denial; nor does he resort to the ridiculously false (and effectively latently anti-Semitic) equation “what Nazis were doing to the Jews, the Jews are now doing to Palestinians.”<br><br>
This simple and all too obvious fact should compel us to render problematic the idea (propagated lately by Habermas, but also not strange to a certain Lacan) of language, symbolic order, as the medium of reconciliation/mediation, of peaceful co-existence, as opposed to the violence of immediate raw confrontation: in language, instead of exerting direct violence on each other, we debate, we exchange words, and such an exchange, even when it is aggressive, presupposes a minimum of recognition of the other. The idea is thus that, insofar as language gets infected by violence, this occurs under the influence of contingent empirical “pathological” circumstances which distort the inherent logic of symbolic communication. What if, however, humans exceed animals in their capacity to violence precisely because they <i>speak</i>?<ref>See Clement Rosset, <i>Le reel. Traite de l’idiotie</i>, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 2004, p.112-114.</ref> As already Hegel was well aware, there is something violent in the very symbolization of a thing, which equals its mortification; this violence operates at multiple levels. Language simplifies the designated thing, reducing it to a “unary feature”; it dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous; it inserts the thing into a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it.
Lacan condensed this aspect of language in his notion of the Master-Signifier which “quilts” and thus holds together a symbolic field. That is to say, for Lacan (at least for his theory of four discourses elaborated in late 1960s), human communication in its most basic, constitutive, dimension does not involve a space of egalitarian intersubjectivity, it is not “balanced,” it does not put the participants in symmetric mutually responsible positions where they all have to follow the same rules and justify their claims with reasons. On the contrary, what Lacan indicates with his notion of the discourse of the Master as the first, inaugural, constitutive, form of discourse, is that every concrete, “really existing,” space of discourse is ultimately grounded in a violent imposition of a Master-Signifier which is <i>stricto sensu</i> “irrational”: it cannot be further grounded in reasons, it is the point at which one can only say that “the buck stops here,” a point at which, in order to stop the endless regress, somebody has to say <i>“It is so because I say it is so!”</i>.
==References==
<references/>
==Source==
* [[The Antinomies of Tolerant Reason: A Blood-Dimmed Tide is Loosed]]. ''Lacan.com'' March 14, 2006. <http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm>
[[Category:Articles by Slavoj Žižek]]
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