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transference (transfert) The term 'transference' first emerged in
Freud's work as simply another term for the displacement of affect from
one idea to another (see Freud, 1900a: SE V, 562). Later on, however, it
came to refer to the patient's relationship to the analyst as it develops in the
treatment. This soon became the central meaning of the term, and is the sense
in which it is usually understood in psychoanalytic theory today.
The use of a special term to denote the patient's relationship to the analyst is
justified by the peculiar character of this relationship. Freud was first struck by
the intensity of the patient's affective reactions to the doctor in Breuer's
treatment of Anna O in 1882, which he argued was due to the patient
transferring unconscious ideas onto the doctor (Freud, 1895d). As he devel-
oped the psychoanalytic method, Freud first regarded the transference exclu-
sively as a RESISTANCE which impedes the recall of repressed memories, an
obstacle to the treatment which must be 'destroyed' (Freud, 1905e: SE VII, 116).
Gradually, however, he modified this view, coming to see the transference also as
a positive factor which helps the treatment to progress. The positive value of
transference lies in the fact that it provides a way for the analysand's history to be
confronted in the immediacy of the present relationship with the analyst; in the
way he relates to the analyst, the analysand inevitably repeats earlier relationships
with other figures (especially those with the parents). This paradoxical nature of
transference, as both an obstacle to the treatment and that which drives the
treatment forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different
and opposing views of transference in psychoanalytic theory today.
Lacan's thinking about transference goes through several stages. His first
work to deal with the subject in any detail is 'An Intervention on the
Transference' (Lacan, 1951), in which he describes the transference in dialec-
tical terms borrowed from Hegel. He criticises ego-psychology for defming the
transference in terms of AFFECTs; 'Transference does not refer to any myster-
lous property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the appearance of
emotion, it only acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in which
it is produced' (Ec, 225).
In other words, Lacan argues that although transference often manifests
itself in the guise of particularly strong affects, such aS LOVE and hate, it
does not consist of such emotions but in the structure of an intersubjective
relationship. This structural definition of transference remains a constant
theme throughout the rest of Lacan's work; he consistently locates the essence
of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary, although it clearly
has powerful imaginary effects. Later on, Lacan will remark that if transfer-
ence often manifests itself under the appearance of love, it is first and foremost
the love of knowledge (savoir) that is concerned.
Lacan returns to the subject of the transference in the seminar of 19534
This time he conceives it not in terms borrowed from Hegelian dialectics but in
terms borrowed from the anthropology of exchange (Mauss, LÈvi-Strauss).
Transference is implicit in the speech act, which involves an exchange of signs
that transforms the speaker and listener:
In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite
simply the speech act. Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and
full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference -
something which takes place which changes the nature of the two beings
present.
(Sl, 109)
In the seminar of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the symbolic
nature of transference, which he identifies with the compulsion to repeat, the
insistence of the symbolic determinants of the subject (S2, 210-11). This is to
be distinguished from the imaginary aspect of transference, namely, the
affective reactions of love and aggressivity. In this distinction between the
symbolic and imaginary aspects of transference, Lacan provides a useful way
of understanding the paradoxical function of the transference in psychoanalytic
treatment; in its symbolic aspect (REPETITION) it helps the treatment progress by
revealing the signifiers of the subject's history, while in its imaginary aspect
(love and hate) it acts as a resistance (see S4, 135; S8, 204).
Lacan's next approach to the subject of transference is in the eighth year of
his seminar (Lacan, 1960-1), entitled simply 'The Transference'. Here he uses
Plato's Symposium to illustrate the relationship between the analysand and the
analyst. Alcibiades compares Socrates to a plain box which encloses a precious
object (Grk agalma); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates,
so the analysand sees his object of desire in the analyst (see OBJETPETITA).
In 1964, Lacan articulates the concept of transference with his concept of the
SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOw, which remains central to Lacan's view of the
transference from then on; indeed, it is this view of the transference which
has come to be seen as Lacan's most complete attempt to theorise the matter.
According to this view, transference is the attribution of knowledge to the
Other, the supposition that the Other is a subject who knows; 'As soon as the
subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere . . . there is transference'
(Sll, 232).
Although the existence of the transference is a necessary condition of
psychoanalytic treatment, it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that
the analyst deal with the transference in a unique way. It is this that differ-
entiates psychoanalysis from SUGGESTION; although both are based on the
transference, psychoanalysis differs from suggestion because the analyst
refuses to use the power given to him by the transference (see E, 236).
From quite early on in the history of psychoanalysis it became common to
distinguish between those aspects of the patient's relationship to the analyst
which were 'adapted to reality' and those which were not. In the latter category
fell all the patient's reactions which were caused by 'perceiving the analyst in
a distorted way'. Some analysts used the term 'transference' to refer to all
aspects of the analysand's relationship to the analyst, in which case they
distinguished the distorted 'neurotic transference' or 'transference neurosis'
from the 'unobjectionable part of the transference' or 'therapeutic alliance'
(Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel). Other analysts argued that the term
'transference' should be restricted to the 'unrealistic' or 'irrational' reactions
of the analysand (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander). However, the com-
mon assumption underlying both of these positions was that the analyst could
tell when the patient was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was
but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other people. The analyst
was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better 'adapted to
reality' than the patient. Informed by his own correct perception of reality, the
analyst could offer 'transference interpretations'; that is, he could point out the
discrepancy between the real situation and the irrational way that the patient
was reacting to it. It was argued that such transference interpretations helped
the analysand to gain 'insight' into his own neurotic transference and thereby
resolve it or 'liquidate' it.
Some of Lacan's most incisive criticisms are directed at this way of
representing psychoanalytic treatment. These criticisms are based on the
following arguinents:
1. The whole idea of adaptation to reality is based on a naive empiricist
epistemology, involving an appeal to an unproblematic notion of 'reality' as an
objective and self-evident given. This entirely neglects what psychoanalysis
has discovered about the construction of reality by the ego on the basis of its
own mÈconnaissance. Hence when the analyst assumes that he is better
adapted to reality than the patient he has no other recourse than 'to fall back
on his own ego' since this is the only 'bit of reality he knows' (E, 231). The
healthy part of the patient's ego is then defmed simply as 'the part that thinks
as we do' (E, 232). This reduces psychoanalytic treatment to a form of
suggestion in which the analyst simply 'imposes his own idea of reality' on
the analysand (E, 232). Thus 'the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in
an authentic manner results, as is usually the case with mankind, in the
exercise of power' (E, 226).
b 2- The idea that the analysand's 'distorted perception of the analyst' could
e liquidated by means of interpretations is a logical fallacy, since 'the
transference is interpreted on the basis of, and with the instrument of, the
transference itself' (S8, 206). In other words, there is nO METALANGUAGE of the
transference, no vantage point outside the transference from which the analyst
could offer an interpretation, since any interpretation he offers 'will be received
as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be' (E, 231)
Thus it is contradictory to claim that the transference can be dissolved by means
of an interpretation when it is the transference itself which conditions the
analysand's acceptance of that interpretation; 'the emergence of the subject
from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum' (E, 231).
Does this mean that Lacanian analysts never interpret the transference?
Certainly not; Lacan affirms that 'it is natural to interpret the transference'
(E, 271), but at the same time he harbours no illusions about the power of such
interpretations to dissolve the transference. Like any other interpretation, the
analyst must use all his art in deciding if and when to interpret the transfer-
ence, and above all must avoid gearing his interpretations exclusively to
interpreting the transference. He must also know exactly what he is seeking
to achieve by such an interpretation; not to rectify the patient's relationship to
reality, but to maintain the analytic dialogue. 'What does it mean, to interpret .
the transference? Nothing else than to fill the void of this deadlock with a lure.
But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting off the
whole process again' (Ec, 225).
When describing the transference as 'positive' or 'negative', Lacan takes two
different approaches. Following Freud, Lacan sometimes uses these adjectives
to refer to the nature of the affects, 'positive transference' referring to loving
affects and 'negative transference' referring to aggressive affects (Ec, 222).
Sometimes, however, Lacan takes the terms 'positive' and 'negative' to refer to
the favourable or unfavourable effects of the transference on the treatment (see
E, 271, where Lacan argues that when the analysand's resistance opposes
suggestion, this resistance must be 'placed in the ranks of the positive trans-
ference' on the grounds that it maintains the direction of the analysis).
Although Lacan does speak occasionally of COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, he gen-
erally prefers not to use this term.
== def ==
The displacement of one's unresolved conflicts, dependencies, and aggressions onto a substitute object (e.g. substituting a lover, spouse, etc. for one's parent). This operation can also occur in the psychoanalytical cure, when a patient transfers onto the analyst feelings that were previously directed to another object. By working through this transference of feelings onto the analyst, the patient can come to grips with the actual cause of his or her feelings.
