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The term '[[signsignifier]]' (''signe'') is defined by [[Jacques Lacan]] as "that which "represents something a subject for someoneanother signifier."<ref>{{S11}} p.207</ref>

The Two main lines of development can be discerned within semiotics: the European line associated with [[signifierFerdinand de Saussure]] is "that (which represents a subject for another signifier[[Saussure]] himself baptised with the name of '[[semiology]]'), and the North American line associated with [[Charles S. Peirce]]."<ref>S11, 207</ref>

By engaging with the concept of the The [[sign, Lacan sets his work in close relation to ]] is constituted by two elements: # a conceptual element (which [[Saussure]] calls the science of semiotics[[signified]]), which has grown rapidly in and # a phonological element (called the twentieth century[[signifier]]).

Two main lines of development can be discerned within semiotics: the European line associated with Ferdinand de Saussure (which Saussure himself baptised with the name of 'semiology'), and the North American line associated with Charles S. PeirceThe two elements are linked by an arbitrary but unbreakable bond.

l. According to Saussure, the sign is the basic unit of ====Saussurean algorithm====[[languageSaussure]].The sign is constituted by two elements: a conceptual element (which Saussure calls the signified), and a phonological element (called the signifier). The two elements are linked by an arbitrary but unbreakable bond. Saussure represented the [[sign ]] by means of a diagram.<ref>Figurel7; see Saussure, 1916: 114</ref>In this diagram, the arrows represent the reciprocal implication inherent in signification, and the line between the signified and the signifier represents umon.

Lacan takes up In this diagram, the Saussurean concept of arrows represent the sign reciprocal implication inherent in his 'linguistic turn' in psychoanalysis during the 1950s[[signification]], but subjects it to several modifications.Firstly, whereas Saussure posited and the reciprocal implication line between the signifier [[signified]] and the signified (they are as mutually interdependent as two sides of a sheet of paper), Lacan argues that the relation between [[signifier and signified is extremely unstable. Secondly, Lacan asserts the existence of an order of 'pure signifiers', where signifiers exist prior to signifieds; this order of purely logical structure is the unconscious. This amounts to a destruction of Saussure's concept of the sign; for Lacan, a language is not composed of signs but of signifiers]] represents union.

To illustrate ====Jacques Lacan====[[Lacan]] takes up the contrast between his own views and those of [[Saussure, Lacan replaces Saussure's diagram ]]an concept of the [[sign with an algorithm which, Lacan argues]] in his 'linguistic turn' in [[psychoanalysis]] during the 1950s, should be attributed but subjects it to Saussure (and is thus now sometimes referred to as the 'Saussurean algorithm')several modifications.<ref> - see E, 149</ref>

The S stands for Firstly, whereas [[Saussure]] posited the reciprocal implication between the [[signifier, ]] and the s for the [[signified; the position ]] (they are as mutually interdependent as two sides of the signified and the signifier is thus inverted, showing the primacy a sheet of the signifier (which is capitalised, whereas the signifier is reduced to mere lower-case italicpaper). The arrows and the circle are abolished, representing [[Lacan]] argues that the absence of a stable or fixed relation between [[signifier ]] and signified. The [[barsignified]] between the signifier and the signified no longer represents union but the resistance inherent in significationis extremely unstable. For Lacan, this algorithm defines "the topography of the unconscious."<ref>E, 163</ref>

2. According to PeirceSecondly, [[Lacan]] asserts the sign is something which represents [[existence]] of an object to some interpretant (the term order of 'objectpure signifiers' can mean, for Peirce, a physical thing, an event, an idea, or another sign). Peirce divides signs into three classes: 'symbols', 'indices' and 'icons', which differ in the way they relate where [[signifier]]s exist prior to the object. The symbol has no 'natural' or necessary relationship to the object it refers to, but is related to the object by a [[signified]]s; this [[order]] of purely conventional rule. The logical [[indexstructure]] has an 'existential relation' to the object it represents (i.e. the index is always spatially or temporally contiguous to the object). The icon represents an object by exhibiting its form via similarity. Peirce's distinctions between icons, indices and symbols are analytical and not intended to be mutually exclusive. Hence a sign will almost always function in a variety of modes; personal pronouns, for example,are signs which function both [[Symbolicunconscious]]ally and indexically.<ref>see Peirce, 1932: 156-73; Burks, 1949</ref>

This amounts to a destruction of [[Saussure]]'s concept of the [[sign]]; for [[Lacan]], a [[language]] is not composed of [[sign]]s but of [[signifier]]s. ====Saussurean algorithm====To illustrate the contrast between his own views and those of [[Saussure]], [[Lacan]] replaces [[Saussure]]'s diagram of the sign with an [[algorithm]] which, [[Lacan]] argues, should be attributed to [[Saussure]] (and is thus now sometimes referred to as the '[[Saussure]]an algorithm').<ref>{{E}} p.149</ref> The '''S''' stands for the [[signifier]], and the '''s''' for the [[signified]]; the position of the [[signified]] and the [[signifier]] is thus inverted, showing the primacy of the [[signifier]] (which is capitalised, whereas the [[signifier]] is reduced to mere lower-case italic).  The arrows and the circle are abolished, representing the [[absence]] of a stable or fixed relation between [[signifier]] and [[signified]].  The [[bar]] between the [[signifier]] and the [[signified]] no longer represents union but the [[resistance]] inherent in [[signification]].  For [[Lacan]], this algorithm defines "the [[topography]] of the [[unconscious]]."<ref>{{E}} p.163</ref>  ==Two== According to [[Peirce]], the [[sign]] is something which represents an object to some interpretant (the term 'object' can mean, for Peirce, a physical thing, an event, an idea, or another sign).  [[Peirce]] [[divide]]s [[sign]]s into three classes: * '[[symbol]]s', * '[[indices]]' and * '[[icon]]s', which differ in the way they relate to the [[object]].  The [[symbol]] has no 'natural' or necessary relationship to the [[object]] it refers to, but is related to the [[object]] by a purely conventional rule. The [[index]] has an 'existential relation' to the [[object]] it represents (i.e. the [[index]] is always spatially or temporally contiguous to the [[object]]).  The [[icon]] represents an [[object]] by exhibiting its form via similarity.  [[Peirce]]'s distinctions between [[icon]]s, [[indices]] and [[symbol]]s are analytical and not intended to be mutually exclusive.  Hence a [[sign]] will almost always function in a variety of modes; personal pronouns, for example, are [[sign]]s which function both symbolically and indexically. [[Lacan ]] takes up [[Peirce]]'s concept of the [[index ]] in order to distinguish between the [[psychoanalytic ]] and medical concepts of the [[symptom]], and to distinguish between (animal) codes [[code]]s and (human) languages[[language]]s.  [[Lacan ]] also develops the concept of the index along the lines set down by [[Roman Jakobson ]] in the concept of the [[shifter]], to distinguish between the [[subject ]] of the [[statement ]] and the [[subject ]] of the [[enunciation]].

* sign, 35, 54, 157, 207, 237, 245 [[Seminar XI]]