Talk:Sign

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Lacan wanted to emphasize]] that the signifier and the signified are two distinct and separate orders. He therefore introduced what he called a 'cut' (coupure) into the Saussurean sign with the introduction of a new emphasis on the bar, as a formula of spearateness rather than reciprocity of signifier and signified.

Lacan writes that the algorithm that is the foundation of modern linguistics is S/s. While Saussure formulated the signified ontop,Lacan puts the signifier on top - to give it pre-eminence. He argued that singifiers are combined in a signifying chain. Meaning does not arise in the individual signifier but in the conneciton between signifiers. Saussure ahd admitted that there can occur a shift or sliding (glissement) in the relationship between the signifier and signified. In constract, Lacan argues not only that the two realms of signifier and signified are never united, but that there is an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier. This does not mean thtat there are no moments of stability at all. Lacan suggests that there are "anchoring points" (points de capiton); these are certain "modal points" which stop the sliding signifiers and hix their meaning.






Jacques Lacan

Lacan defines the sign as that which "represents something for someone," in opposition to the signifier, which is "that which represents a subject for another signifier."[1]

Semotics

By engaging with the concept of the sign, Lacan sets his work in close relation to the science of semiotics, which has grown rapidly in the twentieth century.

Two main lines of development can be discerned within semiotics: the European line associated with Ferdinand de Saussure (which Saussure himself baptized with the name of "semiology"), and the North American line associated with Charles S. Peirce.

Charles S. Peirce

According to Peirce, the sign is something whcih represents an object to some interpretant (the term "object can mean, for Peirce, a physical thing, an event, an idea, or another sign).

Peirce divides signs into three classes: "symbols", "indices" and "icons," which differ in the way they relate to the object.

The symbol has no "natural" or necessary relationship to the object it refers to, but is related to the object by a purely conventional rule.

The index has an "existential relation" to the object it represents (i.e. the index is always spatially or temporally contiguous to the object).

The icon represents an object by exhibiting its form via similarity.

Peirce's distinctions between icons, indices and symbols are analytical and not intended to be mutually exclusive.

Hence a sign will almost always function in a variety of modes; personal pronouns, for example, are signs which function both symbolically and indexically.

Jacques Lacan

Lacan takes up Peirce's concept of the index in order to distinguish between the psychoanalytic and medical concepts of the symptom, and to distinguish between (animal) codes and (human) languages.

Lacan also develops the concept of the index along the lines set down by Roman Jakobson in the concept of the shifter, to distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation.



The term "sign' (French: signe) is defined by Jacques Lacan as that which "represents something for someone."

The signifier is "that which represents a subject for another signifier."[2]

By engaging with the concept of the sign, Lacan sets his work in close relation to the science of semiotics, which has grown rapidly in the twentieth century.

Two main lines of development can be discerned within semiotics: the European line associated with Ferdinand de Saussure (which Saussure himself baptised with the name of 'semiology'), and the North American line associated with Charles S. Peirce.

One

According to Saussure, the sign is the basic unit of language.

The sign is constituted by two elements:

  1. a conceptual element (which Saussure calls the signified), and
  2. a phonological element (called the signifier).

The two elements are linked by an arbitrary but unbreakable bond.

Saussurean algorithm

Saussure represented the sign by means of a diagram.[3]

In this diagram, the arrows represent the reciprocal implication inherent in signification, and the line between the signified and the signifier represents union.

Jacques Lacan

Lacan takes up the Saussurean concept of the sign in his 'linguistic turn' in psychoanalysis during the 1950s, but subjects it to several modifications.

Firstly, whereas Saussure posited the reciprocal implication between the signifier and the signified (they are as mutually interdependent as two sides of a sheet of paper), Lacan argues that the relation between signifier and signified is extremely unstable.

Secondly, Lacan asserts the existence of an order of 'pure signifiers', where signifiers exist prior to signifieds; this order of purely logical structure is the unconscious.

This amounts to a destruction of Saussure's concept of the sign; for Lacan, a language is not composed of signs but of signifiers.

Saussurean algorithm

To illustrate the contrast between his own views and those of Saussure, Lacan replaces Saussure's diagram of the sign with an algorithm which, Lacan argues, should be attributed to Saussure (and is thus now sometimes referred to as the 'Saussurean algorithm').[4]

The S stands for the signifier, and the s for the signified; the position of the signified and the signifier is thus inverted, showing the primacy of the signifier (which is capitalised, whereas the signifier is reduced to mere lower-case italic).

The arrows and the circle are abolished, representing the absence of a stable or fixed relation between signifier and signified.

The bar between the signifier and the signified no longer represents union but the resistance inherent in signification.

For Lacan, this algorithm defines "the topography of the unconscious."[5]


Two

According to Peirce, the sign is something which represents an object to some interpretant (the term 'object' can mean, for Peirce, a physical thing, an event, an idea, or another sign).

Peirce divides signs into three classes:

The symbol has no 'natural' or necessary relationship to the object it refers to, but is related to the object by a purely conventional rule.

The index has an 'existential relation' to the object it represents (i.e. the index is always spatially or temporally contiguous to the object).

The icon represents an object by exhibiting its form via similarity.

Peirce's distinctions between icons, indices and symbols are analytical and not intended to be mutually exclusive.

Hence a sign will almost always function in a variety of modes; personal pronouns, for example, are signs which function both symbolically and indexically.

Lacan takes up Peirce's concept of the index in order to distinguish between the psychoanalytic and medical concepts of the symptom, and to distinguish between (animal) codes and (human) languages.

Lacan also develops the concept of the index along the lines set down by Roman Jakobson in the concept of the shifter, to distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation.

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 207
  2. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.207
  3. Saussure, 1916: 114
  4. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.149
  5. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.163