Difference between revisions of "Subject supposed to know"

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{{Top}}[[sujet]] supposé savoir{{Bottom}}
  
subject suppposed to know (sujet supposÈ savoir)                                    The term
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==Jacques Lacan==
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===Translation===
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The term [[Subject supposed to know|sujet supposé savoir]] can be translated as the "[[subject supposed to know]]" or as the "[[Subject supposed to know|supposed subject of knowledge]]".
  
sujet supposÈ savoir (often abbreviated to S.s.S.) is difficult to translate into
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<!--
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==Self-Consciousness==
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The [[illusion]] of a [[self-consciousness]] which is [[transparent]] to itself in its [[act]] of [[knowledge|knowing]], constituted in the [[mirror stage]], is put into question by [[psychoanalysis]].
  
English. Sheridan translates it as 'subject suppposed to know', and this is the
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==Symbolic Knowledge==
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[[Psychoanalysis]] demonstrates that [[knowledge]] (''[[savoir]]'') is not located in any [[particular]] [[subject]] but is, in fact, [[intersubjective]].<ref>{{L}} [[Seminar IX|Le Séminaire. Livre IX. L'identification, 1961-62]]'', unpublished. [[Seminar]] of 15 November 1961.</ref>
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-->
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===Transference===
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In 1964, [[Lacan]] defines [[transference]] as the [[attribution]] of [[knowledge]] to a [[subject]].
  
translation adopted in most English works on Lacan. However, Schneiderman
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<blockquote>"As soon as the subject who is supposed to [[know]] [[exists]] somewhere there is transference."<ref>{{S11}} p. 232</ref></blockquote>
  
suggests the alternative translation 'supposed subject of knowledge', on the
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It is the [[analysand]]'s ''supposition'' of a subject who [[knows]] that initiates the [[analytic]] [[process]] rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the [[analyst]].  The term [[subject supposed to know]] does not designate the analyst, but rather a function which the analyst may come to embody in the [[treatment]].  It is only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that the transference can be said to be established.<ref>{{S11}} p. 233</ref>
  
grounds that it is the subject, not just the knowledge, which is supposed
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===Signification===
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When this occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the analyst is presumed to possess?
  
(Schneiderman, 1980: vii).
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<blockquote>"He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as he formulates it - quite simply, signification."<ref>{{S11}} p. 253</ref></blockquote>
  
      The phrase is introduced by Lacan in 1961 in order to designate the illusion
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In [[other]] [[words]], the analyst is often [[thought]] to know the [[secret]] [[meaning]] of the analysand's [[word]]s, the [[signification]]s of [[speech]] of which even the [[speaker]] is unaware. This supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire [[retroactively]] a special [[meaning]] for the [[patient]] who "supposes".
  
of a self-consciousness (Ger. Selbstbewufltsein) which is transparent to itself in
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===Practice===
 
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It may happen that the [[patient]] supposes the [[analyst]] to be a subject who knows from the very first treatment, or even before, but it often takes some [[time]] for the transference to become established. In the latter [[case]], "when the subject enters the [[analysis]], he is far from giving the analyst this [[place]] of the [[subject supposed to know]]."<ref>{{S11}} p. 233</ref>  The analysand may initially [[regard]] the analyst as a buffoon, or may withhold information from him in [[order]] to maintain his [[ignorance]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 137</ref> However, "even the [[psychoanalyst]] put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility."<ref>{{S11}} p.234</ref>  
its act of knowing (see CONSCIOUSNEss). This illusion, which is born in the
 
 
 
mirror stage, is put into question by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis demon-
 
 
 
  strates that KNOWLEDGE (savoir) cannot be located in any particular subject but
 
 
 
is, in fact, intersubjective (Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961).
 
 
 
      In 1964, Lacan takes up the phrase in his definition of TRANSFERENCE as the
 
 
 
  attribution of knowledge to asubject; 'As soon as the subject who is supposed
 
 
 
  to know exists somewhere there is transference' (Sll, 232). This definition
 
 
 
emphasises that it is the analysand's supposition of a subject who knows that
 
 
 
  initiates the analytic process.rather than the knowledge actually possessed by
 
 
 
  the analyst.
 
 
 
      The term 'subject supposed to know' does not designate the analyst himself,
 
 
 
    but a function which the analyst may come to embody in the treatment. It is
 
 
 
only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function
 
 
 
  that the transference can besaid to be established (Sll, 233). When this
 
 
 
  occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the analyst is presumed to pos-
 
 
 
    sess? 'He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as
 
 
 
    he formulates it  - quite simply, signification' (Sll, 253). In other words, the
 
 
 
analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words,
 
 
 
    the significations of speech of which      even the speaker is      unaware. This
 
 
 
supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes
 
 
 
    otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks)                to
 
 
 
acquire retroactively a special meaning for the patient who 'supposes'.
 
 
 
      It may happen that the patient supposes the analyst to be a subject who
 
 
 
    knows from the very first meinent of the treatment, or even before, but it often
 
 
 
    takes some time for the transference to become established. In the latter case,
 
 
 
    'when the subject enters tlie analsysis, he is far from giving the analyst this
 
 
 
    place [of the subject supposed to know]' (Sll, 233); the analysand may
 
 
 
initially regard the analyst as a buffoon, or may withold information from
 
 
 
    him in order to maintain his ignorance (S11, 137). However, 'even the
 
 
 
psychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infall-
 
 
 
ibility' (Sl 1, 234); sooner orlater some chance gestiire of the analyst's is taken
 
 
 
by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledge.
 
 
 
    At this point the analyst has come to embody the subject supposed to know; the
 
 
 
    transference is established.
 
 
 
      The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of
 
 
 
knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed
 
 
 
    to know.
 
 
 
      The term 'subject supposed to know' also emphasises the fact that it is a
 
 
 
    particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the
 
 
 
analyst; the analyst is awarethat there is a split between him and the knowl-
 
 
 
edge attributed to him. In ´her words. the analyst must realise that he only
 
 
 
occupies the position of ome who is presumed (by the analysand) to know,
 
 
 
    without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to
 
 
 
    him. The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the
 
 
 
analysand, he knows nothing (Lacan, 1967: 20). However, the fact that it is a
 
 
 
supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than
 
 
 
the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the
 
 
 
analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan
 
 
 
  argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural,
 
 
 
literary and linguistic matters.
 
 
 
      Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed
 
 
 
  to know. When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to
 
 
 
  the analysand, he is effectively saying; 'Come on, say anything, it will all be
 
 
 
  marvellous' (Sl7, 59). In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave
 
 
 
  as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him              as a subject
 
 
 
supposed to know.
 
  
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Sooner or later some [[chance]] gesture of the analyst is taken by the analysand as a [[sign]] of some secret [[intention]], some hidden knowledge.  At this point the analyst has come to embody the [[subject supposed to know]]; the transference is established.  The [[end of analysis]] comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the [[position]] of the [[subject supposed to know]].
  
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===Position of the Analyst===
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The term "[[subject supposed to know]]" also emphasizes the fact that it is a particular [[relationship]] to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the analyst; the analyst is aware that there is a [[split]] between him and the knowledge attributed to him.  In other words, the analyst must realize that he only occupies the position of one who is presumed (by the analysand) to know, without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to him.  The analyst must realize that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the analysand, he knows [[nothing]].<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'École]]," 1967, ''[[Scilicet]]'', no. 1 ([[1968]]) p. 20</ref>
  
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===Training===
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However, the fact that it is a supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the [[treatment|analytic process]], rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the analyst can therefore be [[content]] with [[knowing]] nothing; on the contrary, [[Lacan]] argues that [[analysts]] should emulate [[Freud]] in becoming experts in [[cultural]], [[literary]] and [[linguistic]] matters.
  
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<!--
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==Analysand==
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[[Lacan]] also remarks that, for the [[analyst]], the [[analysand]] is a [[subject supposed to know]].  When the [[analyst]] explains the [[fundamental rule]] of [[free association]] to the [[analysand]], he is effectively saying; "Come on, say anything, it will all be marvellous."<ref>{{S17}} p. 59</ref>  In other words, the [[analyst]] tells the [[analysand]] to behave as if he knew what it was all [[about]], thereby instituting him as a [[subject supposed to know]].
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-->
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==See Also==
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{{See}}
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* [[Analysand]]
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* [[Analyst]]
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* [[Consciousness]]
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* [[End of analysis]]
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||
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* [[Intersubjective]]
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* [[Knowledge]]
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||
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* [[Signification]]
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* [[Subject]]
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||
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* [[Transference]]
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* [[Treatment]]
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{{Also}}
  
 
== References ==
 
== References ==
<references/>
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<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small">
 
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<references />
[[Category:Lacan]]
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</div>
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[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]
 
[[Category:Terms]]
 
[[Category:Terms]]
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[[Category:Dictionary]]
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[[Category:New]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
 
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
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[[Category:Subject]]
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[[Category:People]]
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{{OK}}
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__NOTOC__

Latest revision as of 05:43, 11 September 2021

French: [[sujet supposé savoir]]

Jacques Lacan

Translation

The term sujet supposé savoir can be translated as the "subject supposed to know" or as the "supposed subject of knowledge".

Transference

In 1964, Lacan defines transference as the attribution of knowledge to a subject.

"As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere there is transference."[1]

It is the analysand's supposition of a subject who knows that initiates the analytic process rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst. The term subject supposed to know does not designate the analyst, but rather a function which the analyst may come to embody in the treatment. It is only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that the transference can be said to be established.[2]

Signification

When this occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the analyst is presumed to possess?

"He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as he formulates it - quite simply, signification."[3]

In other words, the analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words, the significations of speech of which even the speaker is unaware. This supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks) to acquire retroactively a special meaning for the patient who "supposes".

Practice

It may happen that the patient supposes the analyst to be a subject who knows from the very first treatment, or even before, but it often takes some time for the transference to become established. In the latter case, "when the subject enters the analysis, he is far from giving the analyst this place of the subject supposed to know."[4] The analysand may initially regard the analyst as a buffoon, or may withhold information from him in order to maintain his ignorance.[5] However, "even the psychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infallibility."[6]

Sooner or later some chance gesture of the analyst is taken by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledge. At this point the analyst has come to embody the subject supposed to know; the transference is established. The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed to know.

Position of the Analyst

The term "subject supposed to know" also emphasizes the fact that it is a particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the analyst; the analyst is aware that there is a split between him and the knowledge attributed to him. In other words, the analyst must realize that he only occupies the position of one who is presumed (by the analysand) to know, without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to him. The analyst must realize that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the analysand, he knows nothing.[7]

Training

However, the fact that it is a supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural, literary and linguistic matters.

See Also

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 232
  2. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 233
  3. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 253
  4. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 233
  5. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 137
  6. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.234
  7. Lacan, Jacques. "Proposition du 9 octobre 1967 sur le psychanalyste de l'École," 1967, Scilicet, no. 1 (1968) p. 20