Invocatory drive
In psychoanalysis, the invocatory drive (French: pulsion invocante) designates the organization of the drive insofar as it is articulated through the voice—calling, being called, hearing, and being heard. Like the scopic drive, the invocatory drive does not correspond to a biological function (such as audition) nor to communicative speech. Rather, it names a libidinal circuit in which enjoyment (jouissance) is bound to the voice as a partial object, independently of meaning or intention.
The concept emerges implicitly in the work of **:contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}** through his theory of the drives and is systematically formalized by **:contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}**, who identifies the voice as one of the privileged forms of object a. In Lacanian theory, the invocatory drive reveals with particular clarity that speech is not exhausted by signification: something of the voice always exceeds what is said.
The invocatory drive belongs to the series of partial drives, alongside the oral, anal, and scopic drives. Its specificity lies in its relation to the Other and to the symbolic order, since the voice is the medium through which the subject is first addressed and inscribed in language. As such, the invocatory drive plays a central role in psychoanalytic accounts of fantasy, desire, transference, and clinical structures.
The Drive and the Voice in Psychoanalysis
Drive (Trieb) and Partial Drives
Freud defines the drive (Trieb) as a borderline concept between the somatic and the psychic, characterized by source, pressure, aim, and object.[1] The drive is not oriented toward a natural biological goal; its satisfaction is achieved through repetition rather than completion.
Within this framework, Freud introduces the notion of partial drives, which are not subordinated to genital reproduction and persist throughout life. These drives are organized around partial objects and bodily zones, and they continue to structure desire and symptom formation in adult life.
Although Freud does not isolate the invocatory drive as such, his theory provides the conceptual groundwork for its later elaboration. The voice appears in Freud’s work as a vehicle of affect, command, and memory, particularly in relation to the superego and to early experiences of being addressed.
Freud on Voice, Call, and Superego
The Voice Beyond Meaning
In Freud’s writings, the voice is never treated merely as a neutral carrier of linguistic meaning. In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud emphasizes that the superego is formed through internalized parental voices, experienced less as messages than as imperatives or commands.[2]
What is internalized here is not simply what was said, but the tone, force, and insistence of the address. The voice thus functions as an object that exerts pressure on the subject independently of semantic content. This insight anticipates Lacan’s later claim that the voice is a partial object detached from meaning.
Calling and Being Called
Freud also repeatedly notes the importance of being called or addressed in early psychic life. The infant’s relation to the caregiver is mediated not only by feeding and touch, but by vocal presence—calling, soothing, commanding. These early vocal exchanges leave durable traces in the psychic economy, even when their semantic content is forgotten.
While Freud does not formalize these observations as a distinct drive, they indicate that the voice can function as a source of satisfaction and compulsion beyond communication. It is this dimension that Lacan will isolate as the invocatory drive.
Lacan’s Formulation of the Invocatory Drive
The Voice as Object a
Lacan explicitly identifies the voice as one of the privileged forms of object a, alongside the gaze.[3] Object $a$ is not an empirical object but the remainder produced by the subject’s entry into language, marking a point of lost enjoyment that returns as the cause of desire.
In the invocatory drive, the voice occupies this position. It is not identical with speech, nor with auditory perception. The voice, as object $a$, is what remains when meaning is subtracted from speech—the sonorous dimension that can captivate, disturb, or command the subject without conveying information.
This distinction explains why the voice can be experienced as intrusive or compelling even when its content is banal or nonsensical. The invocatory drive is not oriented toward understanding, but toward enjoyment bound to vocal presence.
Voice and the Symbolic Order
Unlike the scopic drive, which is closely tied to the visual field, the invocatory drive has a privileged relation to the Symbolic order. The voice is the medium through which the subject is first addressed by the Other and thereby constituted as a speaking being.
At the same time, Lacan insists that the voice as object $a$ is not reducible to the signifier. It emerges precisely at the point where signification fails—where the voice resists being fully integrated into meaning. In this sense, the invocatory drive marks a limit of the symbolic rather than its fulfillment.
Fantasy, Desire, and Jouissance
The Invocatory Fantasy
As with all drives, the invocatory drive is structured by fantasy. Fantasy provides the framework through which the subject situates himself in relation to object $a$. In the invocatory register, fantasy organizes the relation between calling, being called, and the elusive voice of the Other.
The standard matheme of fantasy is written as:
In this schema, the barred subject ($) relates to object $a$ as the cause of desire. In the invocatory drive, the subject’s desire is sustained by the voice as an object that cannot be fully possessed or silenced.[3]
Fantasy allows the subject to manage the potentially overwhelming dimension of the voice by framing it—attributing it to a speaker, a law, or a command—while the object dimension of the voice persists beneath this framing.
Jouissance of the Voice
The invocatory drive is a privileged site of jouissance. Jouissance here does not lie in communication or understanding, but in the repetitive circuit of calling and being called, hearing and being heard. This enjoyment often exceeds the pleasure principle and may be experienced as anxiety, irritation, or compulsion.
Phenomena such as intrusive commands, compelling melodies, or the irresistible quality of certain voices illustrate how jouissance can attach to the voice independently of meaning. The invocatory drive thus demonstrates that enjoyment can be bound to the very medium of speech rather than to its content.
Invocatory Drive and Clinical Structures
Neurosis
In neurosis, the invocatory drive is typically mediated by repression and displacement. The voice of the Other may appear as a source of guilt, obligation, or anxiety, particularly in relation to the superego. The subject may be troubled less by what is said than by the insistence with which it is said.
Analytic work often reveals how the subject’s desire is organized around being addressed or recognized by the Other, even when such recognition is experienced as oppressive.
Perversion
In perversion, the subject may attempt to stage or control the voice as object $a$. This can involve positioning oneself as the one who commands, provokes, or elicits the Other’s voice. As with other drives, the decisive factor is not behavior but the subject’s structural relation to the Other’s enjoyment.
Lacan’s formulation that, in perversion, the subject makes himself the instrument of the Other’s jouissance applies equally in the invocatory register, where the subject may serve as the support of the Other’s voice.
Psychosis
In psychosis, the invocatory drive can appear in a particularly unmediated form, most notably in auditory hallucinations. Lacan emphasizes that such hallucinations are not simply perceptual errors, but manifestations of the voice as object $a$ unregulated by the symbolic order.[4]
Here, the voice may be experienced as intrusive, commanding, or persecutory, illustrating the consequences of a failure to situate the invocatory drive within a stable symbolic framework.
Transference and Analytic Practice
In psychoanalytic treatment, the invocatory drive is constantly at stake, since analysis is conducted through speech and listening. The analyst’s voice—its tone, rhythm, and silences—can become a support for transference independently of what is said.
Interpretation does not aim to master or eliminate the voice, but to articulate its function within the subject’s fantasy and to modify the circuit of jouissance attached to it. By bringing the invocatory drive into speech, analysis allows the subject to reconfigure his relation to being addressed by the Other.
Conclusion
The invocatory drive occupies a central place in Lacanian psychoanalysis by revealing that speech is never reducible to meaning. Through the concept of the voice as object $a$, Lacan shows that enjoyment attaches to the very fact of being addressed and of hearing, beyond communication or understanding.
Like the scopic drive, the invocatory drive demonstrates that the subject is not master of his relation to the world. The voice insists, calls, and returns, structuring desire and enjoyment in ways that escape conscious intention. As such, the invocatory drive remains an indispensable concept for understanding the relation between language, desire, and jouissance in psychoanalysis.
See also
References
- ↑ Sigmund Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIV, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), pp. 117–140.
- ↑ Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), in Standard Edition, Vol. XIX (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), pp. 12–66.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), pp. 268–276.
- ↑ Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses (1955–1956), trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).