Knowledge

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In psychoanalytic theory, knowledge designates not a neutral or transparent grasp of truth, but a complex structural relation between the subject, language, desire, and the unconscious. From its Freudian origins to its Lacanian reformulation, psychoanalysis fundamentally challenges classical epistemology by demonstrating that knowledge is neither fully conscious nor fully possessed by the knowing subject. Instead, it is fractured, mediated, and structured by unconscious processes and symbolic systems.

This reconfiguration reaches its most systematic articulation in the work of Jacques Lacan, who distinguishes between two fundamentally different forms of knowledge:

  • Imaginary knowledge (connaissance), associated with ego-identification, self-recognition, and misrecognition (méconnaissance), and
  • Symbolic knowledge (savoir), associated with language, the unconscious, and the field of the Other.

This distinction underpins Lacan’s broader theory of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real, and constitutes one of the central epistemological innovations of twentieth‑century psychoanalysis.

Unlike philosophical theories of knowledge grounded in certainty, representation, or justification, psychoanalysis treats knowledge as inseparable from desire, enjoyment (jouissance), and subjective division. Knowledge is thus neither reducible to conscious cognition nor oriented toward completeness or mastery.

Knowledge as a Psychoanalytic Concept

In psychoanalysis, knowledge cannot be understood independently of the unconscious. Freud’s discovery of unconscious mental processes undermined the classical notion of a self-transparent subject capable of knowing itself fully. From the outset, psychoanalysis demonstrated that subjects may know something without knowing that they know it, and may fail to know what they believe they know.

This paradox places psychoanalytic knowledge outside the domain of traditional epistemology. Knowledge in psychoanalysis:

  • Is not fully conscious
  • Is not fully owned by the subject
  • Is structured by repression, displacement, and symbolic mediation

Lacan radicalizes this insight by relocating knowledge within language itself. Rather than conceiving the unconscious as a storehouse of representations, Lacan conceptualizes it as a structure of signifiers that speaks through the subject.

Registers and the Structure of Knowledge

Lacan situates knowledge within his tripartite theory of psychic registers:

  • The Imaginary — the domain of images, identification, and ego formation
  • The Symbolic — the domain of language, law, and signification
  • The Real — that which resists symbolization entirely

The distinction between connaissance and savoir maps directly onto the Imaginary and Symbolic registers. These are not developmental stages or subjective attitudes, but structural modes of relation.

Connaissance: Imaginary Knowledge

Ego, Identification, and Misrecognition

Connaissance refers to knowledge grounded in the Imaginary register, tied to images, identifications, and ego coherence. It is the knowledge of the ego — the sense that one knows oneself as a unified, consistent entity.

This form of knowledge originates in the mirror stage, where the infant identifies with an external image of bodily unity that contrasts with its lived experience of fragmentation. The ego is thus constituted through misrecognition (méconnaissance), insofar as the image of unity conceals the subject’s internal division.[1]

Imaginary knowledge is therefore:

  • Alienated
  • Narcissistic
  • Structured by illusion

It gives rise to the belief in self-transparency and mastery, masking the unconscious determinants of thought and desire.

Paranoiac Structure of Imaginary Knowledge

Lacan characterizes connaissance as paranoiac knowledge, not merely as a clinical analogy but as a structural claim. Like paranoia, imaginary knowledge involves:

  • Certainty without doubt
  • Belief in total explanation
  • Fantasies of mastery and control

This knowledge resists contradiction and defends the ego against symbolic disruption. As such, it often appears in analysis as resistance, manifesting in coherent self-narratives that block access to unconscious truth.[1]

Savoir: Symbolic Knowledge

Knowledge Without a Subject

In contrast to connaissance, savoir belongs to the Symbolic register. It is not knowledge possessed by an ego, but knowledge inscribed in language. Lacan defines savoir as the articulation of signifiers within a symbolic network that precedes and structures the subject.

This knowledge is fundamentally intersubjective and decentered. It does not belong to a knowing agent, but operates through discourse. The subject is not the source of knowledge but its effect.

The Unconscious as Knowledge

Lacan famously states that “the unconscious is structured like a language” and that it is a form of knowledge that does not know itself.[2]

In this formulation:

  • The unconscious is not ignorance
  • Nor is it hidden content awaiting discovery
  • It is an active, signifying structure

Symptoms, dreams, slips, and repetitions are not failures of knowledge but expressions of savoir operating beyond conscious intent.

Freudian Foundations of Unconscious Knowledge

Freud’s metapsychology already anticipates this distinction. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud shows that dreams possess a logic and coherence unknown to the dreamer, revealing a form of knowledge inaccessible to consciousness.[3]

Freud’s concepts of:

  • Repression
  • The return of the repressed
  • Transference

all imply a knowing unconscious. Lacan’s contribution lies in formalizing this knowledge linguistically, transforming Freud’s dynamic model into a structural one.

Knowledge, Language, and the Signifying Chain

Symbolic knowledge operates through the signifying chain — the differential relations among signifiers. Meaning is not fixed but produced retroactively through articulation. The subject’s speech always says more than it intends.

Because savoir is bound to signifiers:

  • It is fragmented
  • It appears discontinuously
  • It resists totalization

This accounts for the impossibility of absolute knowledge in psychoanalysis. There is always a remainder — something that escapes articulation.

Knowledge, Truth, and Division

For Lacan, truth is not equivalent to knowledge. Truth emerges only partially, “half‑said,” and always in tension with knowledge. The subject is structurally divided between:

  • What is said
  • What is meant
  • What insists unconsciously

This division prevents the subject from coinciding fully with their knowledge.

Knowledge in Psychoanalytic Treatment

Free Association and Symbolic Emergence

Psychoanalytic technique privileges free association because it allows symbolic knowledge to emerge without ego control. The analysand’s speech reveals unconscious structures precisely where coherence breaks down.

Resistance as Defense of Imaginary Knowledge

Resistance arises when the subject clings to connaissance — to coherent self-knowledge that shields against symbolic disruption. Analysis works by undermining this imaginary certainty, not by replacing it with new mastery.

The Subject Supposed to Know

The analytic situation is structured by the subject supposed to know, a position attributed to the analyst by the analysand.[2] This supposition sustains transference and allows unconscious knowledge to circulate.

Crucially, the analyst does not possess this knowledge. Analysis aims at dissolving the supposition, allowing the subject to confront their own relation to savoir.

Knowledge and Jouissance

Lacan’s statement that “knowledge is the jouissance of the Other” situates knowledge within the economy of enjoyment.[4]

Knowledge:

  • Produces satisfaction
  • Sustains desire
  • Generates excess

In this sense, knowledge is never neutral. It is libidinally invested and bound to power, authority, and fantasy.

The Four Discourses and Knowledge

Lacan’s theory of the four discourses formalizes the social circulation of knowledge:

  1. Master’s discourse — knowledge serves authority
  2. University discourse — knowledge is institutionalized
  3. Hysteric’s discourse — knowledge is interrogated
  4. Analyst’s discourse — knowledge is suspended in favor of truth

Each discourse configures savoir differently, revealing that knowledge is always socially and structurally positioned.[4]

Knowledge, Ideology, and Culture

Later Lacanian theorists, notably Slavoj Žižek, extend this framework to ideology. Ideology functions as connaissance: a structured misrecognition that organizes belief and enjoyment. Ideological critique thus parallels psychoanalysis in exposing how subjects “know very well” yet act as if they do not.[5]

Conclusion

In psychoanalysis, knowledge is neither transparent nor complete. Divided between connaissance and savoir, it structures subjectivity through illusion and disruption, mastery and lack. Imaginary knowledge promises coherence but conceals division; symbolic knowledge reveals truth but resists totalization.

Psychoanalysis does not aim at absolute knowledge, but at a transformation of the subject’s relation to knowledge — one that acknowledges lack, accepts division, and opens a space for desire.

See Also

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton, 1977, pp. 1–7.
  2. 2.0 2.1 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, Norton, 1981, pp. 20–24.
  3. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE 5–6, Hogarth Press, 1953, pp. 504–627.
  4. 4.0 4.1 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. Russell Grigg, Norton, 2007, p. 13.
  5. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, 1989, pp. 28–39.